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REVITALIZING OUR CITIES OR RESTORING TIES
TO THEM? REDIRECTING THE DEBATE
Donald A. Hicks*
1896 sends greetings to 1996. We of today reach forth our
hands across the gulf of 100 years to clasp your hands. We
make you heirs to all we have and'enjoin you to improve
your heritage. We bequeath to you a city of a century,
prosperous and beautiful and yet far from our ideal. Some
of our streets are not well lighted. Some are unpaved. Many
are unclean. Many of the people are poor and some are
vainly seeking work at living wages.
Yet the world family is better and happier than it was 100
years ago. This hundred years has given to the world the
locomotive and the steamboat, the telegraph, telephone,
photograph, electric light, electric motor and many other
wise and beneficent discoveries.
Have you invented a flying machine or found the North
Pole? What have you done?'
INTRODUCTION
The belief in an urban crisis rooted in the presumed "decline"
of our cities-and especially our inner cities-continues to be
widespread. For the past three decades, grim medical meta-
phors have been used routinely to diagnose our cities as either
sick or dying. Today, their afflictions-as demoralizing as they
are daunting-often are considered their defining features:
poverty perpetuated as often by low-paying employment as by
unemployment and expressed by hopelessness as well as
homelessness; welfare and controlled substance dependency;
* Professor of Political Economy and Vice Chair of the Bruton Center for
Development Studies, University of Texas at Dallas. B.A. 1969, Indiana University;
Ph.D. 1976, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. Chris Kelley, Cleveland Time Capsule's Message Proves Timeless, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 12, 1994, at 25A (reporting excerpts from a letter written by Mrs.
Elroy M. Avery, chairman of Cleveland's First Centennial Commission and placed in
a time capsule in 1896).
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family and personal dysfunction; intergroup tensions spawned
by both race- and class-based segregation; low educational
attainment brought on as much by attending poor public
schools as by dropping out of them; and vulnerability to crime.
Because our cities are judged to be failing us so badly, the
recurrent impulse is to discover ways of bringing about their
fundamental revitalization. The clear implication is that our
cities no longer work as they once did, and because of their
dysfunction and diminished capacity we are all the worse for
it. With this premise as a starting point, this Symposium's
papers seek to identify how specific legal reforms might con-
tribute to such an urban revitalization.
In this Article I generally concur that certain legal reforms
do hold considerable potential for ameliorating some of the
desperate circumstances we find in our cities today. My view
is rooted in the recognition that past reforms which dismantled
legal barriers to equal opportunity were of monumental signifi-
cance in broadening social and economic access to our urban
arrangements. But it also is rooted in the conviction that a new
wave of legal reform might well be required in order to recon-
sider other past reforms that, however unintentionally, have
made many matters worse. Above all, any proposed legal re-
form should be decoupled from the notion that achieving broad
social gains requires that we must somehow first restore a
general vitality to our cities. I suggest that our cities continue
to show remarkable vitality. Instead, what does need revital-
ization are the prospects that individuals who were left behind
by a transforming economy or held back by personal circum-
stances-wherever they may live-can have greater access to
the opportunities which our evolving economic and settlement
arrangements offer-wherever they may be.
In the view of many, the problems of our cities can be traced
to the belief that they are forgotten and forsaken. But is this
view justified? Certainly America's cities today are undeniably
the settings for circumstances that are an affront to our nation.
Complex webs of these afflictions have their greatest visibility
in our inner cities and therefore confront us with unavoidable
challenges. Nonetheless, does it necessarily follow that our
cities are failing us because we find in them broad and deep
pools of personal or community distress? After all, cities always
have been repositories of illiteracy, illegitimacy, and inequality.
Is there not an important distinction to be drawn between the
problems pooled in our cities and those of cities themselves?
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What has been forgotten is that it is in the nature of cities
to pool the forsaken. In large part that is what cities do. That
is their modus operandi. Not only is that an important part of
the work of cities, but it has been so since cities first appeared.2
From our nation's infancy, accelerating urbanization and
industrialization were twin engines of our nation's first century
of development. The result was an emerging system of urban
areas. Yet there was remarkably little appreciation of or affect-
ion for them.3
Ever since observers first despaired of the degenerative influ-
ence of early towns and cities on the character of our infant
nation, there has been a steady accounting of Dickensian
conditions found in them. This tradition gathered momentum
with the publication of Lincoln Steffens' The Shame of the
Cities,4 as industrializing cities struggled with the task of
balancing the assimilation of successive waves of foreign
immigrants with surging in-migration from our own rural
areas. Yet, people kept flocking to our industrial-era cities.
Why? They did so because it was apparent that despite their
wretchedness, cities welcomed the distressed, which was not
the same as causing that distress.
Today, when we focus on individual cities, we typically see
only their problems. Relatively transparent is the fact that for
generations our cities have primarily offered solutions for
individuals and their families. To many, our cities represented
2. Plato spoke of it l.ong ago. "[Flor each of them is not one state, but many: two
at least, which are at war"with one another, one of the rich, the other of the poor ....
To treat them all as a single state is a complete mistake." PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 113
(Francis M. Cornford trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (circa 380 B.C.).
3. The ingrained anti-urban bias in American culture since the nation's founding
is characterized by de Tocqueville's observations of New York and Philadelphia:
The lower ranks which inhabit these cities constitute a rabble even more
formidable than the populace of European towns. They consist of freed blacks,
in the first place, who are condemned by the laws and by public opinion to a
hereditary state of misery and degradation. They also contain a multitude of
Europeans who have been driven to the shores of the New World by their
misfortunes or their misconduct; and they bring to the United States all our
greatest vices, without any of those interests which counteract their baneful
influence. As inhabitants of a country where they have no civil rights, they are
ready to turn all the passions which agitate the community to their own
advantage ....
MORTON WHrrE & LUCIA WHrrE, THE INTELEuAL VEISuS THE CnyI: FROM THOMAS JEFFER-
SON TO FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT 23-24 (1962) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 299 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1945) (1835)).
4. LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (1904).
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elegant pieces of social technology capable of dispensing rising
wealth, health, and welfare to their inhabitants. As mechaniza-
tion and rising productivity rendered ever larger percentages
of workers redundant in the farm-centered economy, opportuni-
ties drew them to the cities. By the early twentieth century,
the factory-centered industrial economy taking root in our
cities offered jobs at wages higher than those available in the
countryside. The inauguration of municipal services such as
public sanitation, chlorination of water supplies, and public
health programs led to declines in the infant mortality rates
and in occurrence of infectious diseases such as cholera, small-
pox, and typhoid. The principal alchemy taking place in
American cities for centuries has been the initial pooling of
poverty and its gradual transformation into prosperity. That
transformation is what cities are supposed to do, and for the
most part, ours have performed it very well.
In the nineteenth century most of our living and working was
spent in ways that led to the emergence of our industrial-era
cities.5 Historically, these cities were more useful to us because
of their social and economic designs than their physical or
architectural ones. However, much of the twentieth century has
witnessed the transit to a new paradigm characterized by
declining city populations. For example, the City of Detroit lost
twenty-eight percent of its population between 1950 and 1975.6
Indeed, during the 1970s alone, of the nation's fifty-six central
cities 7 with populations of 250,000 or more in 1970, thirty-two
lost population.8 Of the twenty cities of this size in the indus-
trial Northeast and Midwest, eighteen lost population.9 More-
over, during the same decade, of the twenty-nine largest
metropolitan areas ° in 1970, the central cities accounted for
5. By 1820 New York City reached the 50,000 population threshold, with Chicago
passing the same milestone in 1860 and Detroit in 1870.
6. R.D. NORTON, CITY LIFE-CYcLEs AND AMERICAN URBAN POLICY 2 tbl. 1-1 (1979).
7. A central city is a political jurisdiction anchoring a metropolitan area, such
as Dallas. A suburban city is a suburban municipality elsewhere in a metropolitan
area, such as Plano or Richardson, Texas.
8. Donald A. Hicks, Urban and Economic Adjustment to the Postindustrial Era,
in TRANSmON TO THE 21ST CENTURY: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR ECONOMIC AND URBAN-
REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION 345, 351-52 (Donald A. Hicks & Norman J. Glickman eds.,
1983).
9. Id.
10. In general, a metropolitan area consists of one or more central cities with a
combined population of at least 50,000 together with those counties (or equivalents)
that are socially and economically linked to it. DONALD E. STARSINIC & RICHARD L.
FoIsrALL, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN
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a declining share of the area's population in all but two of
them.,'
This counter-urbanization dynamic, while building for dec-
ades, only became apparent after midcentury. The big story has
been the way in which a newly scaled urban economy has
relentlessly spilled out over the boundaries of our large indus-
trial-era cities. Compact industrial-era cities began to spread
out via suburbanization creating larger-scale metropolitan
areas. The urban policy impulse-the need of urban centers
somehow to restore their hold over the major shaping forces of
the time-was born of the confusion and concern associated
with this steady decoupling of our settlement and production
patterns from our historical political jurisdictions. 2 Our early
industrial-era cities were created through processes of con-
centration: a sort of centripetal force in which most social and
economic life was drawn to central and compact locations. As
industrial-era technologies emerged to permit a more expansive
use of space, these forces began to wane, thus permitting
population and production to "leave town." Industrial-era
cities-and their political caretakers-did not much care for
these new dynamics that together sapped their cities' economic
hegemony and political bases. As a result, the early urban
policy impulses in the late 1940s were motivated by a desire
to stem these erosions.
Of course, today there is little patience for viewing our so-called
"urban crisis" through the lens of such abstract processes.
However, we cannot expect to be served well by outdated mental
maps of urban areas as compact population centers which were
slowly, and later more-rapidly, being unraveled all through the
twentieth century. Fortunately, the idea that many of our older
industrial arrangements-our factories, farms, and even our
urban centers-are in flux encounters less resistance today than
it did even a decade or so ago. A greater degree of acceptance
and even curiosity about how best to derive the broadest possible
benefits from the passing of these former arrangements is
detectable. Indeed, even the short-lived and misguided notion
AREA AND COUNTY POPULATION GROWTH: 1980 TO 1987, at 29 (Current Population Reports,
Series P-25, No. 1039, 1989); see also WILLIAM H. FREY & ALDEN SPEARE, JR., REGIONAL
AND METROPOLITAN GROwTH AND DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATEs 18-36 (1988) (discussing
the use of metropolitan areas as units of analysis).
11. Hicks, supra note 8, at 353.
12. See W.R. Barnes & L.C. Ledebur, Toward a New Political Economy of Metro-
politan Regions, 9 ENV'T & PLAN. C.: GOV'T & POL'Y 127, 127-39 (1991).
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of a "national urban policy," itself, reflects increasing acknowl-
edgement that the changes underway in our cities, once instinc-
tively interpreted as decline and deterioration, may well be
integral to a more fundamental ongoing transformation after
all. 1"
Now it is time to take the next step. It is time to recognize
that we misdirect our energies when we call for the revital-
ization or restoration of our cities. For the most part, it is not
our cities, or the natural development processes that continu-
ously rework and recreate them, that have failed us. Rather,
the real task before us is to find ways to reattach those people
left in poverty within cities transforming around them. Ways
must be found to remove barriers limiting the access of dis-
tressed communities to the social and economic rearrange-
ments taking place in their cities. Part of that task will likely
involve discovering that many of the problems we find brewing
in our cities are ones we have created ourselves. For, in the
course of past efforts to insulate people and places from the
effects of changes they faced, we have often unwittingly under-
mined the adaptive capacities of both.
A new era of legal reforms, guided by a deeper understanding
of the forces of urban change, offers prospects superior to
reforms likely to result from the resurrection of a national
urban policy. This new era should begin with a recommitment
to the swift and certain enforcement of the civil rights laws set
in place three decades ago. It should then extend to the rede-
sign of those features of welfare and immigration policies that
exacerbate urban poverty by overburdening the absorptive
capacities of our inner cities. The process should include
education and housing policy reforms that promote social and
residential mobility options. Finally, it should decrease the
regulatory burden on the larger economy in order to improve
employment and enterprise opportunities for the poor and
minority communities.
In this Article, Part I addresses the tension between two very
different perspectives of urban America. A "development"
perspective with its emphasis on the incessant dynamics of a
variety of demographic, economic, and cultural processes that
continually shape settlement patterns and economic arrange-
13. See Michael A. Stegman, National Urban Policy Revisited, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1737, 1751-62 (1993) (summarizing the evolution of national urban policies from 1970
to 1993).
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ments is contrasted with a "governance" perspective with its
primary concern for containing and channeling those dynamics
so as to sustain extant geo-political forms. While the latter
perspective typically enjoys the support of current constituen-
cies, the former perspective, often viewed as representing a
challenge to them, sets the stage for the emergence of new
constituencies.
Part II suggests that so-called urban "decline" is better
understood as the continuing development of a larger urban
system and of the individual cities that compose it. City forms
and functions both continue to mirror the evolving economy,
technologies, and cultural values that define the transit
between industrial eras. As dynamics that had long concentrat-
ed population and employment have been overtaken gradually
by those that disperse them, the spatial and skill-based urban
arrangements that made them superior to what had come
before also worked to limit access among certain social groups.
Part III revisits the major legal landmarks arrayed across
the past half century as successive efforts to revitalize our
cities were proposed and implemented. This section offers
assessments of why they were largely unsuccessful. In many
respects those revitalization efforts will be viewed as both
defensive and backward-looking, inadvertently seeking to prop
up a fading urban-industrial order increasingly unable to
provide for new realities.
Part IV challenges the original and underlying assumptions
of urban revitalization efforts. It seeks to demonstrate that
despite their continued transformations-and in many respects
precisely because of them-our'urban areas actually continue
to work quite well. Moreover, they continue to work well for
those urban poor and even those ghetto poor who are able to
retain access to the reworked opportunities around them.
Part V addresses why such access is increasingly problematic
for large numbers of urban poor. It finds answers both in how
urban poverty itself has been transformed and in how urban
economies have done so.
Part VI argues that we should redirect the half-century old
national urban policy impulse that may well be stirring once
again. Campaigns to revitalize our cities are misdirected
because the emphases of such efforts are misplaced. It is not
our cities that need restoration or revitalization of a sort that
would not otherwise occur in the absence of general economic
Revitalizing Our Cities 819
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expansion. Rather, it is the ties to them of marginal popula-
tions that need restoration.
Part VII proposes potential urban legal reforms that would
be instrumental in reattaching marginal populations to their
cities. In some instances this requires redirecting or abandon-
ing some of the social engineering logic and mechanisms
embodied in earlier legislation that have proven tragically
counterproductive.
I. URBAN PROCESS AND URBAN POLICY:
A COLLISION COURSE
National development policy must address uneven economic
performance, disparities in unemployment rates, and income
inequities between city and suburban residents and between
minority groups and whites. 4
Many readers might expect a social scientist to feel a ritual
obligation to use his technical skills to deepen the evidentiary
base that so indicts our cities, thereby joining in a general
urban policy call-to-arms. This Article, however, seeks to
contribute in another way. It offers a reorganization and
reinterpretation of this evidence by reaching beyond conven-
tional city-by-city accounting approaches, seeking to distin-
guish between the circumstances in individual cities and the
condition of the larger urban system which they comprise.
When viewed from a broader systems perspective, it is no
longer clear that the conventional indictment of our cities--or
even our inner cities-can be sustained. Moreover, the uncriti-
cal acceptance of premises equating our cities with crisis merits
reexamination.
What motivates this seemingly contrary view? In part it
involves recognition of the inevitable tensions between urban
development and urban governance and how each views cities.
The urban development perspective tends to assign primacy to
the relatively spontaneous processes whereby social and
economic activities continuously shape and sustain our urban
14. Harold Wolman et al., National Urban Economic Development Policy, 14 J.
URB. AFF. 217, 217 (1992).
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areas as part of an urban system.15 The elasticity of settle-
ments and their role in delivering rising levels and wider
distributions of wealth, health, and welfare are viewed posi-
tively.
In contrast, the urban governance perspective tends to focus
on the power of strategic policies that emerge from the archi-
tecture and authority of national, state, and local governmental
jurisdictions in pursuit of the same goals. The fundamental
problem is that many of the strategic policies, typically justi-
fied on the grounds of market failure presumed evident in
individual cities, fail to see the compensatory mechanisms at
work in the larger urban system.
An urban development perspective expects investment flows
to be spatially patterned and uneven. For example, as the
growing information-exchange function of central business
districts (CBDs) presented new frontiers of opportunity, this
view would expect that investments in office and supporting
15. As August Losch wrote:
Enforced perpetuation of an originally profitable combination of interests, and
the perfect preservation of old conditions in particular, creates a museum, which,
like all such institutions, requires large sums for its maintenance. As soon as
the breaking up of old combinations is economically justified, every attempt to
obstruct it means a sacrifice. A sacrifice, however, that may be vindicated now
and then by the fact that it helps to preserve the political and cultural existence
of an economic landscape for a while even though it has passed its economic
prime. Those who have to bear the burden in this case are the inhabitants, who,
prevented from migrating, are forced to put up with a lower standard of living.
In the long run they are also politically endangered thereby. If it is a case merely
of a depressed area within a country, the prosperous areas generally bear the
cost. This is not always a wise policy, even when the importance of extra-
economic causes is freely admitted. It would often be much better to facilitate
the breaking up of an old combination of land, people, and economic activities
and seek systematically for a new and vital one; that is, to promote adaptation
rather than to obstruct it.
AUGUST LOSCH, ECONOMICS OF LOCATION 326-27 (William H. Woglom trans., 2d ed. 1954)
(footnote omitted); see also NORTON, supra note 6, at 23-30 (stating that regional
transitions between urban areas are more important than the transitions of individual
cities); PANEL ON POLICIES AND PROSPECTS FOR METROPOLITAN AND NON METROPOLITAN
AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE
EIGHTIES, URBAN AMERICA IN THE EIGHTIES: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 4-5 (1980)
[hereinafter PRESIDiNT'S COMMISSION REPORT] (suggesting that the federal government
should aid cities in adjusting to redistributive processes rather than attempting to
reverse the processes); Jack Sommer, Renewing a Dialogue on Urban America, in U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REDISCOVERING URBAN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES
ON THE 1980S, at 1-1, 1-4 to 1-5 (Jack Sommer & Donald A. Hicks eds., 1993) [hereinaf-
ter REDISCOVERING URBAN AMERICA] (describing the urban systems perspective of
viewing the nation's cities as a whole).
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structures be regarded as instrumental to the recycling of older
urban centers. Similarly, as new residential and production
arrangements offered complementary roles to suburban areas,
it would likewise expect that the bulk of new residential,
industrial, and commercial investment would be steered to
locations well removed from older inner-city areas. Such
selective disinvestment from central cities, then, is viewed as
equally integral to the recycling of industrial-era cities as
would be selected investments. After all, neither the United
States nor the world needs the Detroit and the Dallas that
were originally built to serve an earlier economic era. Increas-
ingly, metropolitan-scale regions are the building blocks of
national and global economic structures. It is important, then,
that more localized investments contribute to the emergence
of these new economic arrangements so that local enterprise
and residents can remain relevant to the newly scaled economy
and society developing around them.
The governance perspective, however, strains to eliminate
the unevenness that sets these flows in motion. Such flows
threaten to diminish the dominance of established jurisdictions
in the new arrangements. This perspective urges that we strive
to protect older central cities from forms of reconstruction that
would require them to relinquish to broader metropolitan
structures the economic roles that were the bases for the
cultural hegemony, economic centrality, and political domi-
nance they enjoyed historically.
It is all but inevitable that any political consensus required
to devise and implement some form of urban policy will tend
to discount or otherwise distrust precisely those naturally
occurring developmental remedies that might offer the greatest
prospects for alleviating place-based poverty and disadvantage.
This is especially true if part of the larger solution involves the
continued geographical redistribution of people and enterprise.
Not surprisingly, government initiatives typically have been
crafted, explicitly or unwittingly, in ways that seek to retard
or otherwise redirect development dynamics. This was evident
in policy efforts as diverse as urban renewal, Model Cities, and
Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs) targeted to
improve the lives of people indirectly by upgrading places
directly.
It is not at all clear that urban America requires resusci-
tation of the kind that is commonly proposed. It is undeniable
that our cities as political jurisdictions, especially some of our
SPRING AND SUMMER 1994]
older industrial centers, are under tremendous pressure to
accommodate the dominant forces shaping the lives of individu-
als and their institutions. In general, however, urban settle-
ments continue to exhibit a remarkable flexibility and capacity
for continuous adjustment. Moreover, if the recent record is
any indication, our cities retain the capacity to create immense
opportunity and to distribute it broadly. Much more capacity,
however, currently constrained by the unintended impacts of
past policy initiatives, could potentially be unleashed through
new legal reform efforts.
Assigning primacy to an explicit urban policy generally has
led to discussions of how urban development dynamics can be
channeled in ways that lead to outcomes we value, such as
stable neighborhoods, real estate development, and settlement
patterns that provide predictable tax revenue streams, and
commuting patterns that permit bold mass transit options. By
contrast, assigning primacy to urban processes is more likely
to lead to increased appreciation for how the outcomes we get
spontaneously, however unfamiliar and unwelcome at first, are
ones in which we later come to invest enormous value. Thus,
we come to value the residential and recreational areas which
were constructed on land made available by the demolition of
empty factories and warehouses, the opportunity for home-
ownership and decent schools that first required that we move
out of familiar neighborhoods, and the employment prospects
in newly emerging industries and enterprises made possible by
the demise of older, less competitive ones.
Regrettably, in recent decades the tensions between these
two perspectives often have led to intellectual stalemate. The
developmental process camp often has failed to appreciate the
hnportance of legal sanctions in providing the stability and
predictability necessary to encourage the investment and
innovation required by urban America's ceaseless adjustments
to new demographic trends, new technologies, and new rela-
tionships to a global-scale economy. At the same time, the
governance camp often has felt the need to defend cities by
first declaring a crisis and then responding in ways that
threaten to turn them into museums for the preservation of a
more familiar way of life. We can do better.
This Article urges thoughtful legal reforms which must build
bridges from our cities to new industrial and settlement
arrangements, rather than seeking to perpetuate historical
functions of cities or rebuild them according to older social
Revitalizing Our Cities
824 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reforn [VOL. 27:3&4
blueprints. Most important are reforms that would promote
fairness and opportunity by expanding social access to a
changing world. While a detailed description of those reforms
is beyond the scope of this Article, Part VII offers some general
guidelines for where we might begin efforts to develop these
new reforms.
II. URBAN DEVELOPMENT AS URBAN DECLINE
How is it that today America's cities have come to be iden-
tified so closely with the ills of a nation? Cities are considered
not just settings for these problems, but in many respects their
causes. For the most part, as our nation's urban system has
developed since the 1950s, a variety of circumstances have
created three major barriers to opportunity: the urban space
barrier, the labor market skills barrier, and the segregation
and poverty barrier. This Part discusses each barrier in turn,
and examines the effects each has had on the presumed decline
of America's cities.
A. Urban Space As a Barrier
The first of these barriers relates directly to patterns of
population and employment distribution in the United States.
For more than a century, our nation's industrial-era cities had
grown large and powerful as urbanization swept people and
jobs into them. The 1920 census was the first to report that tlhe
majority of Americans lived in urban areas, up from approxi-
mately five percent in 1790.16 Beginning in the 1950s, however,
the centralizing dynamic was challenged visibly by something
new and therefore threatening. For the first time, our marquee
industrial-era cities-including New York, Detroit, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh-began to register population losses. 17 By 1970,
a majority of the nation's metropolitan population lived in
suburbs, and by 1990, the majority of all Americans lived in
16. JOHN F. LONG, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION
DECONCENTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Special Demographic Analysis No. CDS-81-5,
1981).
17. NORTON, supra note 6, at 2.
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suburbs."8 Inexorably, the central cores of cities, 19 like rural
areas before them, had become increasingly detached from the
lives of most Americans.
Production activities were redistributed in a similar way. As
industries continued to accommodate shifting technological
regimes, manufacturers began to filter out of older, less effi-
cient production settings and into newer ones. What steam-
powered technologies had once tethered tightly to central city
locations, electricity-based technologies began to pry loose. As
successive transportation and communication innovations
combined to diminish the significance of physical distance, the
importance of geographical proximity-the once-powerful
centralizing influence on residence and production-began to
decline.
Compact and centrally located multi-story factories gradually
gave way to sprawling single-story plants located along inter-
state highways, near regional airports, with easier access to
the suburban pools of skilled workers on whom they were
increasingly dependent. Inside these plants, older forms of
rigid work patterns yielded to clustered production tool sets
and computer-assisted process controls tended by technically
trained workers. Similarly, retail and related consumer servic-
es migrated away from downtown streets and out to enclosed
suburban shopping malls. Indeed, between 1948 and 1977
employment losses in manufacturing, wholesale, and retail
sectors mounted dramatically in our major central cities: New
York, 662,000; Chicago, 454,000; Philadelphia, 261,000; and
Detroit, 286,000.20
As a result, a wide range of activities began to drift apart
and away from our central cities. Some relocated to lower-cost
settings or to be closer to where skilled workers lived, while
others, which were more dependent on specialized services and
face-to-face interactions, stayed behind. Metropolitan-scale
urban economies restructured spatially. As relative population
18. David L. Ames et al., Rethinking American Urban Policy, 14 J. URB. AFF. 197,
198, 200 (1992).
19. Most of the central-city population lives outside the boundaries of marquee,
older industrial-era cities such as New York, Detroit, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh which
were made synonymous with decline from 1950 through the 1970s. See KATHERINE L.
BRADBURY ET AL., URBAN DECLINE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN CITIEs 51,237-39 (1982)
(analyzing urban decline in Cleveland as typical of older industrial areas throughout
the Northeast and Midwest).
20. John D. Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in THE NEW
URBAN REALITY 33, 34 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985).
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and employment losses grew to become absolute ones, our
oldest and largest central cities began to contract dramatically.
From the beginning, the process of suburbanization was
viewed from a city-centric perspective. Predictably, the focus
was on how decentralization was undermining established
central cities, or in other words, on what was being lost rather
than on what was being gained. From this perspective, these
population and employment redistributions inevitably came to
be viewed as problematic rather than developmental.
Suburbanization also was perceived as a political and cul-
tural threat.22 To those tied to established political arrange-
ments and assigned urban administrative responsibilities,
these demographic shifts represented the start of something
sinister indeed. 23 Big-city mayors faced the prospect of having
to meet rising urban service burdens as tax base growth
slowed. Local elected officials viewed with alarm the growth
in the ranks of registered voters in suburbs as central-city
political clout began to wane.
There was little appreciation for the fact that these shifts
represented a continuation of urban exodus already underway
for more than half a century. Although early evidence of the
dispersal and decentralization within the nation's settlement
patterns actually was detectable as early as the 1880s,24 it took
21. Dominant cultural values pulling new linking technologies (e.g., transporta-
tion and communications) into use, unintentional public sector government encourage-
ment (e.g., interstate highway construction funding), and stages of economic devel-
opment all make identifiable contributions to the complex etiology ofsuburbanization.
Moreover, suburbanization is a dynamic evident in advanced industrial countries
around the world. Its extent and pace tend to vary with local circumstances. Indeed,
while the suburbanization phenomenon is evident throughout advanced industrial
countries, it is perhaps nowhere as marked as in the United States. Daniel R. Vining,
Jr., Migration between the Core and the Periphery, SCI. AM., Dec. 1982, at 45, 45-53;
Daniel R. Vining, Jr. & Thomas Kontuly, Population Dispersal from Major Metropoli-
tan Regions:An International Comparison, 3 INT'L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 49, 49-73 (1978);
Daniel R. Vining, Jr. et al., Population Dispersal from Core Regions: A Description and
Tentative Explanation of the Patterns in Twenty-One Countries, in TRANSITION TO THE
21ST CENTuRY: PROSPECTS AND POUCFS FOR ECONOMIC AND URBAN-REGIONAL TRANSFORMA-
TION, supra note 8, at 81, 81-111.
22. See Barry Schwartz, Images of Suburbia: Some Revisionist Commentary and
Conclusions, in THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SUBURBS 325, 331 (Barry Schwartz ed.,
1976).
23. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYImNG IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA 86 (1977); Matthew Edel, Land Policy, Economic Cycles, and Social Conflict,
in THE LAND USE POLICY DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 127, 130, 132 (Judith I. de
Neufville ed., 1981).
24. DONALD A. ICKS, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. RESTRUCTURNG, RELOCA-
TION, AND RENEWAL 125 (1985).
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decades for the forces of counter-urbanization to reach the
point where they began to overwhelm the forces of urbaniza-
tion. Since 1950, settlements larger than 100,000 have steadily
been declining as a share of the population in the United
States, and this same trend has been evident since 1930 for
settlements of over one million.25
The movement of population and employment away from
central cities also was viewed as fueling social catastrophe. As
investment and employment growth moved to the suburbs,
many who remained in central cities found it increasingly
difficult to accommodate these new dispersed arrangements. 6
As John Kain identified three decades ago, space itself had
emerged as a barrier to suburban employment prospects for
many central-city residents.27 Special angst was generated by
the outmigration of entry-level manufacturing jobs which
required only modest education or training. Early urban
policies, therefore, placed heavy emphasis on efforts to steer
development back into central cities.28 Even if it had been
possible to bring development back to central cities, however,
another barrier was diminishing the utility of this general solu-
tion.
B. Labor Market Skills As a Barrier
By the 1970s, it became apparent that shifts of another sort
were challenging the industrial-era city. A structural transfor-
mation of the urban economy was underway, the spatial impacts
of which were far more complex than simple suburbanization.
As our central cities became centers of information processing
and administration rather than goods production, new patterns
of sourcing, production and distribution arose and new flatter,
25. Id. More recently, of the nation's 56 metropolitan areas with populations
larger than 250,000 in 1980, the central city share of metropolitan population had
declined in all but the largest (New York City) and the smallest (Virginia Beach, Va.)
areas. EDWIN MILLS, STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE URBAN ECONOMY 22-29 (1972).
26. See John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Unemployment, and Metropoli-
tan Decentralization, 82 Q.J. ECON. 175, 191-92 (1968) (noting that suburbanization
of employment reduced job opportunities for central-city residents, and in particular,
for black residents).
27. Id.
28. See ROYCE HANSON, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
URBAN POLICY 1970-1980: LESSONS FROM THE PAST 1-2 (1982).
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less hierarchical corporate structures emerged.29 Increasingly,
many kinds of entry-level production jobs previously available
as the lower rungs on ladders of opportunity for central-city
residents were as likely to evaporate as to emigrate to the
suburbs. Factory and office automation and workplace restruc-
turing meant that software could share the spotlight with
suburbs as culprits in what widely was viewed as the decline
of urban America.
In reality, the broader economy, including the new diverse
services sector, like manufacturing before it, slowly was adjust-
ing to new cultural possibilities and technological regimes. As
the ties between workers and workplaces were transformed,
the ties between workers and work began to change as well.
There was no way of insulating the fundamental notion of
mono-centric industrial-era settlement patterns from these
shifts. As new labor markets placed increased emphasis on
education-related competencies, public policies focussed primar-
ily on eliminating spatial mismatches between distressed
urban residents and opportunity could be expected to accom-
plish little.
C. Segregation and the Urban Underclass: The Inner
City As a Poverty Machine
The interaction of these space and skill barriers with the
demographics of inner-city neighborhoods resulted in the most
devastating effects on what has come to be widely regarded as
an urban underclass.3 ° It is here that the presumed decline of
our cities became entwined with the issues surrounding race
and ethnicity, social class, and group culture. Poverty concen-
tration rooted in residential segregation led to psychic barriers
that powerfully reinforced and perpetuated a physical separa-
tion from the mainstream society and economy.3' For poor
29. See John D. Kasarda, Structural Factors Affecting the Location and Timing
of Urban Underclass Growth, 11 URB. GEOGRAPHY 234, 240-46 (1990).
30. For a detailed treatment of how the restructuring of the urban economy,
namely, the decline of high-wage low-skill employment opportunities in the inner city,
reached all the way down into black family life, see WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
31. See Douglas S. Massey et al., Segregation, the Concentration of Poverty, and
the Life Chances ofIndividuals, 20 SOC. SCI. RES. 397, 399 (1991).
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youth surrounded by poverty, the contextual influence could
be truly devastating.32 "High concentrations of poverty create
an environment in which unwed childbearing, male joblessness,
and welfare dependency not only cease to be deviant, but
become the norm."33 It is in this manner that the social isola-
tion of poor people transformed poverty areas into true ghettos.
Being poor was less pernicious than living in a neighborhood
in which the bulk of one's neighbors were also poor.
Inner-city areas began to exhibit the self-perpetuating fea-
tures of rural Appalachia or the Third World. As a result, their
primary problem was no longer simply poverty. Rather, it was
the prospect of persistent poverty throughout one's life that
then would be passed on to successive generations. For resi-
dents in these areas, poverty was less episodic than endemic.
These neighborhoods no longer simply pooled the poor, as our
central cities-indeed all cities-have traditionally done; they
produced the poor. As selective migration enabled some to
translate material success into mobility options, those people
who remained grew poorer along with their neighborhoods.34
This developmental irony is not an isolated case. At times,
the concentrative force of such poverty has been strengthened
unwittingly by the very policy efforts designed to combat it. For
example, the construction of massive public housing complexes
in inner-city neighborhoods functioned to further segregate
blacks, and therefore concentrate the poor.35 Public housing
often so heavily concentrated inner-city poverty that the transit
of a host neighborhood along a development cycle over time
was severely obstructed.3" That is, not only were the economic
prospects of an individual severely reduced by living in a
32. Dropping out of school, for example, sets in motion a devastating downward
spiral in the ability of a youngster to negotiate urban settings. Rebecca Clark has
reported that particularly in low-income areas, school dropout rates among boys rise
rapidly as the percentage of poor people within a community rises from only zero to
five percent. Neighborhood Influence on Teenage Boy Dropouts, URB. INST. POL'Y & RES.
REP., Fall 1992, at 9, 10 (discussing Rebecca Clark's analysis of the correlation
between various neighborhood characteristics and the neighborhood's high school
dropout rate).
33. Massey et al., supra note 31, at 399.
34. The power of neighborhoods to mediate the influences of the larger world are
indicated by Massey et al.: "Since people who occupy the same space are likely to
interact frequently and intensively, neighborhoods have a profound effect on the
values, beliefs, and knowledge of the people who grow up and live within them....'
Id. at 398.
35. See Douglas S. Massey & Shawn M. Kanaiaupuni, Public Housing and the
Concentration of Poverty, 74 Soc. Sci. Q. 109 (1993).
36. Id.
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poverty neighborhood, but the economic prospects of upgrading
that neighborhood were reduced as well. In effect poor people
and poor neighborhoods were locked in a fateful embrace.
In addition, there has been widespread concern that efforts
to provide income support through welfare programs can'
aggravate the individual and institutional deficits that keep
the inner-city poor in a state of poverty. 37 Recent research, for
example, indicates that among the urban poor, there is a
positive relationship between the generosity of welfare pay-
ments and the prevalence of female-headed households.3"
At the same time, however, inner-city neighborhoods cannot
be said to have become so barren of opportunity that their
residents find it impossible to help themselves. Despite much
evidence that the environment plays a powerful role in rein-
forcing poverty, the very same physical environment may
present very different opportunity structures to some groups.39
37. - On the logic of this causal sequence whereby ever easier access to rising
federal welfare benefits has undermined the more mainstream and traditional
importance of marriage before childbearing, see CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND:
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984).
38. Robert Moffitt, The Effect of the US. Welfare System on Marital Status, 41
J. PUB. ECON. 101, 121-22 (1990). Eggers and Massey find that welfare may well
discourage employment even while it encourages the rise of female-headed households.
They note, however, that the relative importance of welfare effects against effects
related to the restructuring of the inner-city economy are difficult to deduce from
cross-sectional research designs. In other words, unless we can observe effects over
time, it is difficult to decide whether welfare payments or economic restructuring
wields the more decisive effects on female-headed households. Mitchell L. Eggers &
Douglas S. Massey, The Structural Determinants of Urban Poverty: A Comparison of
Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, 20 SoC. Sci. RES. 217, 249-50 (1991) [hereinafter Eggers
& Massey, Structural Determinants]. In a subsequent study employing a longitudinal
research design, these analysts found that rising levels of welfare payments between
1970 and 1980 accounted for little of the changes in either the level of black male em-
ployment, the formation of female-headed households, or rates of black poverty.
Mitchell L. Eggers & Douglas S. Massey, A Longitudinal Analysis of Urban Poverty:
Blacks in U.S. Metropolitan Areas between 1970 and 1980, 21 SOC. SCI. RES. 175, 175
(1992).
39. See Charles Hirschman & Morrison G. Wong, Socioeconomic Gains of Asian
Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics: 1960-1976, 90 AM. J. SOC. 584 (1984) (analyzing
socioeconomic inequality between ethnic groups); see also Kasarda, supra note 20, at
57 (noting racial disparity in central-city employment rates). Indeed, the role of group
culture may well make an independent contribution to the intergenerational trans-
mission of poverty. There is evidence indicating, for example, that black males tend
to be substantially less likely than Anglo or Mexican males to wed the mothers of
their children regardless of employment status or level of neighborhood poverty.
Mark Testa et al., Employment and Marriage among Inner-City Fathers, 501 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 79,83-84 (1989). In a similar vein, Sassen draws attention
to the income-generating activities that take place outside the formal economy and
thereby constitute a vibrant "informal economy" within postindustrial societies.
Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy, in DUAL CITY: RESTRUCTURING NEW YORK 79,
79-101 (John H. Mollenkopf & Manuel Castells eds., 1991).
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For example, many Asian entrepreneurs-such as the South
Korean shopkeepers depicted in the glare of the eruptions in
South Los Angeles-manage to wrest remarkable opportunity
out of the same neighborhoods generally regarded as economi-
cally barren by other residents. 40 The keys to their success
appear to involve not only a group culture deeply supportive
of higher educational attainment but also the leveraging of
their extended family organization, a bootstrap strategy
reminiscent of the immigrant experience a century ago.41
Moreover, the concentration of poverty alone need not lead to
the creation of a ghetto underclass where strong counterforces
operate. Indeed, as the foreign-born share of concentrated
poverty neighborhoods increased from 3.5% in 1970 to 10.1%
in 1990, it became apparent that the contextual "drag" of
neighborhood poverty can affect different social groups differ-
ently.42 Recent research at the Urban Institute has revealed
that despite the generally lower educational levels of foreign-
born residents relative to the native-born, residents in
predominantly "immigrant" neighborhoods were more likely to
be employed, have higher incomes and were less likely to be
in single-parent or welfare-receiving families than were those
in predominantly "native" neighborhoods.43 This suggests that
while concentrated poverty can have a corrosive effect on a
community, a culture of poverty is not a necessary conse-
quence. Poverty alone may predispose, but it cannot predict,
the life chances of individuals.
The dynamics sustaining inner-city ghettos are extremely
complex, and seeking to reverse them poses a monumental
challenge. The key question here, however, is whether or not
the very existence of inner-city ghettos constitutes an indict-
ment of our cities. Does the presence of poverty concentrations
in our cities indicate that our cities no longer work and there-
fore need revitalizing? What should we make of the possibility
that concentrated poverty may be as much a threat to our
cities as our cities are to the poor?
40. John D. Kasarda, Why Asians Can Prosper Where Blacks Fail, WALL ST. J.,
May 28, 1992, at A20.
41. Id.
42. See Immigrants in High Poverty Areas, URB. INST. POLY & RES. REP., Summer
1994, at 22 (highlighting Wendy Zimmermann and Mitchell Tobin's research
comparing high poverty neighborhoods consisting of a majority of foreign-born
residents with those that have few foreign-born residents).
43. Id.
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III. PAST URBAN REVITALIZATION AND RENEWAL EFFORTS:
A SUCCESSION OF FEDERAL INITIATIVES
Federal programs aimed at directly influencing urban
development patterns or their consequences began in earnest
nearly a half century ago. The earliest efforts attempted to
eradicate local slums.44 Under the rubric of urban renewal and
downtown revitalization, slums often were bulldozed in the
certainty that the programs were addressing the declining
capacity of cities to deliver adequate housing.45
These early efforts were directed at the housing conditions
in inner-city areas largely because their conditions were an
affront to the middle class.46 Many years went by before we
began to appreciate that, in fact, these efforts crippled the
capacity of cities to accommodate the urban poor-to move
them up and along socially.47 These early programs of urban
renewal succeeded in destroying the lower tiers of city housing
options which were deemed unacceptable to middle class
sensibilities, but which were needed to accommodate new
arrivals and the temporarily down and out.4"
It was not until later that America's cities as breeding
grouniids for all manner of social distress became objects of
explicit concern and federal government initiative. Beginning
with the Great Society and War on Poverty efforts, increas-
ingly the aim was to eradicate poverty by addressing its
spatial determinants. It became natural to look for linkages
between circumstance and context, because we found so much
poverty concentrated in cities, and these links were not diffi-
cult to find.
As new demographic and industrial forces unravelled older
urban centers across the country, new central-city oriented
44. This impulse was embodied in the 1949 Housing Act, and especially Title I
of that legislation which established the federal urban renewal program in close
cooperation with local communities. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338,
tit. I, §§ 101-110, 63 Stat. 413, 414-21 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1460), omitted by Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633, 652 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5316 (1988)). See Catherine Bauer, Redevelopment: A Misfit in the Fifties, in THE
FUTuRE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 7, 7-18 (Coleman Woodbury ed., 1953).
45. MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN
RENEWAL, 1949-1962, at 1-14 (1964).
46. See id. at 3.
47. See id. at 52-72.
48. See id. at 67.
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political coalitions concerned with the declining political and
economic dominance of cities arose to join forces with smaller
coalitions concerned with the physical deterioration of inner
cities. Through the early 1960s, federal attention was drawn
to the social as well as physical correlates of poverty.49
The next quarter century yielded a succession of urban policy
initiatives. During the mid-1960s, a pair of urban and commu-
nity development initiatives, the Community Action Program °
and Model Cities Program,5' responded to the impulse for
political inclusiveness. These programs aimed at the neighbor-
hood circumstances that defined the lives of inner-city resi-
dents. The Department of Housing and Urban Development was
established in 1965 to serve as the administrative coordinator
of these federal efforts.52 Later, the Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1968,' 3 which aimed to stimulate low-income
housing construction, was passed alongside the Fair Housing
Act of 1968. 54
By the mid-1970s, a new policy logic had emerged which held
that even though a considerable amount of funding flowed into
our urban areas, its effectiveness was limited because it flowed
from too many federal spigots. Refuge was sought in program
consolidation and better coordination. The resulting Community
49. This is evidenced by the establishment by President Johnson of the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) to coordinate the War on Poverty. Economic Opportu-
nity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 601, 78 Stat. 508, 528 (originally codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2941), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-35, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9912(a) (1982)). Other
examples include the establishment of the Head Start program, Pub. L. No. 88-452,
78 Stat. 508, 516-20 (1964), repealed and replaced by Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
499-508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Job
Corps, designed to connect disadvantaged youth to both education and later, to
employment. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, tit. I, § 102, 78
Stat. 508, 508 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1707 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
50. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, tit. II, 78 Stat. 508,
516, repealed by Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 683(a), 95
Stat. 357, 519 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9912(a) (1982)).
51. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-754, 80 Stat. 1255, omitted by Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, § 116(a), 88 Stat. 633, 652 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5316 (1988)); see also HANSON, supra note 28, at 3-5 (reviewing the history and
content of the Great Society's urban program).
52. Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 3,
79 Stat. 667 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3352 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
53. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified as amended primarily in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
54. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
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Development Block Grants 55 and Urban Development Action
Grants (UDAGs)56 continued to aim for the eradication of slums
and its social supports. This new tack also represented a
response to concern over the rising fiscal and political costs of
these efforts. The politics surrounding urban aid funding had
grown increasingly vocal. By evidencing the notion that "local
folk" know best how to diagnose and respond to their own
problems, this new approach was also a convenient way to shift
much of the political decision making back to the local level.
A block of federal funding was given to local officials, and they
were responsible for allocating and prioritizing the funds. Most
importantly, they could also take the heat.
The arrival of the 1980s brought a hiatus of sorts. The
political climate had changed along with the ascendance of a
new political philosophy. The Reagan and Bush administrations
were less beholden to urban political coalitions, and interest
in ambitious new federal urban policy initiatives fizzled. The
only new urban-oriented policy initiative, urban enterprise
zones, was proposed but not enacted by either administration.57
Many states and localities did, however, seize upon the idea of
enterprise zones, and have experimented with it in both urban
and rural settings.
55. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit.
1, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
56. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit.
I, § 119, 91 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
57. See OFFICE OF PoL'Y DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVEL-
OPMENT, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 27-36 (1991). The logic of the
federal enterprise zone involves using incentives to stimulate entrepreneurship and
economic development within a relatively small, explicitly designated geographical
area. Among the incentives included in the Bush administration fiscal year 1992
budget, for example, were: the abolition of the capital gains tax on tangible assets used
to operate a business; the deferral of a portion of the personal income taxes assessed
on investors in qualified enterprises; and a refundable tax credit on personal income
taxes that could be applied to the wages earned by low-income workers employed
within qualified enterprises.
Following yet another political climate shift, the same basic idea has been
rewrapped and offered by the Clinton administration as a combination of enterprise
and "empowerment" zones in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, tit. XIII, ch. 1, § 13301, 107 Stat. 543 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 1391-1397D (Supp. V 1993)).
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A. Taking Stock: How Successful
Have These Efforts Been?
For the most part the track record of these federal urban
policy initiatives is disappointing. The conventional response
is that the nation made a valiant effort but became exhausted
far short of the goal. Much evidence supports this view. A list
of the typical excuses follows:
1. The Nation Lost Its Resolve-Many would suggest that
because past efforts were ineffective and even destructive, our
political will flagged. Moreover, the dormancy of any explicit
national urban policy during the 1980s is viewed widely as
the regrettable consequence of a mean-spirited Reagan-Bush
political era.58
Since the late 1960s, our cities have become politicized in new
ways. Liberals began to regard our cities as a litmus test of our
social and domestic policies. Motivated by the persistence of
poverty and its correlates, and firm in the belief that the
generous application of public resources and political will could
ameliorate urban problems, liberals often urged redoubled
efforts and budgets. By contrast, conservatives generally
cautioned against expanding yet another new arena for gov-
ernment activism. For them, silence often became a policy
strategy. Ironically, in such a cartoonish setting both ideologies
generally remained unventilated, and as a result, few common
lessons can be derived from the experience.
2. Policymakers Were Not Single-Minded-Many claim that
the federal, state, and local governments inadvertently aided
and even accelerated the very forces threatening central-city
dominance.59 This is doubtless true.6" It is widely appreciated
58. See, e.g., Peter Drier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, and Solu-
tions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1351, 1383-86 (1993).
59. See Katherine Lyall, Comments, in URBAN LAND POLICY FOR THE 1980S: THE
MESSAGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 41, 41-42 (George Lefcoe ed., 1993)
(commenting on Donald A. Hicks, National Urban Land Policy: Facing the Inevitability
of City and Regional Evolution, in URBAN LAND POLICY FOR THE 1980S, supra, at 21). See
generaly U S. DEPYT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVEWPmENT, THiE PRMMENT% NATIONAL URBAN
POLICY REPORT: 1980, at 3-12 to 3-19, 11-1 to 11-27 (1980) [hereinafter HUD REPORT
1980] (discussing the effects of federal and state policies on central cities).
60. While the list of possible federal influences is endless, among the more fre-
quently mentioned are federal tax policies such as investment tax credits that have
the effect of steering investment and employment either into or away from specific
activities and locations. Similarly, federal highway and infrastructure policy, as
evidenced in the construction of the interstate highway system, often had the
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that the spatial influences accompanying otherwise nonurban
federal programs wield far more influence than do explicitly
urban-oriented policies and programs."' Federal government
efforts to build infrastructure above ground, such as interstate
highways, and below ground, such as waste-water treatment
facilities, clearly facilitated dispersal from our cities. General
revenue sharing, which distributed eighty-five billion dollars
over the fourteen years of its existence, extended a fiscal lifeline
to even the smallest struggling jurisdictions.
It also is commonly noted that our efforts were erratic,
uncoordinated, and backward-looking. Like the Pentagon's
national defense policy, federal urban policy frequently was
criticized as oriented toward fighting the last war.
3. The Government Did Not Spend Enough Money-Finally,
some would suggest that failures could be traced to the lack of
sufficient funding. Although today the 1980s are thought of as
a decade of greed and neglect, the evidence that urban poverty
efforts failed because we did not spend enough is unpersuasive.
In fact, since the late 1960s, more than $2.5 trillion has been
spent on urban renewal and poverty efforts directed at our
cities.62
During the 1980s, of the explicit federal programs that aided
cities directly, only the general revenue sharing63 and UDAGs
were terminated.64 While both of these programs satisfied the
unintended effect of raising the attractiveness of locations outside central cities. The
income tax deductibility of mortgage interest is believed to have facilitated movement
of middle-class residents to suburban areas. State policy influences are felt in highway
planning and facility siting involving institutions of higher education, airports, and
medical facilities. Finally, local policies with potentially anti-urban effects include
everything from tax incentives that lure enterprise between locations to municipal
service delivery inequities. See Lyall, supra note 59, at 42.
61. See, e.g., Edwin S. Mills, Non- Urban Policies as Urban Policies, 24 URB. STUD.
561 (1987).
62. Stephen Moore & Dean Stansel, The Myth ofAmerica's Underfunded Cities,
188 CATO INST. 2 (1993).
.63. Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, ch. 67, §§ 6701-6724, 96 Stat. 1010
(originally codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6724), repealed by Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, tit. XIV, § 14001(a)(1), 100 Stat.
327.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1988).
In 1977, Congress authorized the Secretary of HUD "to make urban development
action grants to severely distressed cities and urban counties." Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit. I, § 119(a), 91 Stat. 1125.
The amounts of these grants were limited to $500 million in 1982 and 1983, Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. III, § 308(a), 95 Stat. 392,
$440 million in 1984-1986, Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984; Domestic
Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181,
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primal political impulse to demonstrate concern by dispersing
funds directly to cities, neither amassed a record of obvious
achievement. The federal resources flowing directly to people
from other urban-oriented programs more than compensated
for the terminated funds. Indeed, during the Bush term the rate
of growth of general domestic spending (24.5%) exceeded that
of either Reagan (4.0%) or Carter (12.0%).65 Moreover, during
the 1980s, the real dollar value of federal aid flowing directly
to the urban poor increased more than ten percent to $285
billion, while the direct federal aid to cities was halved.6"
Today, the federal government contributes approximately one-
sixth of the resources expended by states and localities. 7 These
distributive bureaucracies are estimated to absorb fully two-
thirds of every dollar of federal aid intended for the urban
poor.6" Our federal response structures have calcified, larded
down by layer upon layer of vested interest and outdated world
views. Ironically, the urban-oriented federal bureaucracies
established in the 1950s-1970s have shown nowhere near the
flexibility in mission and response that our urban areas have.
It is also fair to ask the question: How much is enough?
Absolute dollar amounts of federal spending are an easy
political target. When we note that per capita spending in our
cities doubled between 1965 and 1990-not counting federal
funds for education, health, and welfare programs-it is
difficult to conclude that any failure was the consequence of
inadequate funding.69 Rather, it would be even more specious
to have spent such considerable sums guided by the best of
intentions in the pursuit of such noble goals and then not ask
at some point what has come of it all. That would constitute
public policy malpractice of a most egregious sort. It is time to
look elsewhere for an understanding of why such massive
funding failed to register anything like the results sought.
tit. I, § 121(a), 97 Stat. 1168-69, and $225 million in 1988 and 1989. Housing and
Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, tit. V, § 501(c), 101 Stat.
1923. Allocations for the UDAG program were not included within the 1989 Budget.
This, in a sense, was a deliberate commission by an omission.
65. Scott A. Hodge & Robert Rector, What George Bush Is Not Being Told about
Federal Spending, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 4, 1992,
at 4.
66. Moore & Stansel, supra note 62, at 33.
67. Information provided by the Office of Assistant Secretary, Office of Planning,
Development, and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
68. Hell is a Dying City, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1993, at 13, 13.
69. Moore & Stansel, supra note 62, at 32.
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B. Cities versus System: Misapplied Urban Arithmetic
How to eliminate or transform ... damaged communities,
bringing all to a decent standard, is the object of an urban
development policy.
7
Typically, past analyses of the circumstances defining our
nation's urban areas focused nearly exclusively on the experi-
ences of individual jurisdictions.7 1 From this perspective, each
community is judged to have its own past and future worthy
of public concern. Each also is judged to have its own devel-
opmental trajectory and pace for moving into the future. Early
urban policy efforts, in particular, assigned primacy to identify-
ing those barriers hindering the progress of individual cities
along their respective paths of historical development. v2 One
of the goals of past efforts to articulate a national urban policy
has been to develop a responsiveness whereby local public
officials and private citizens in thousands of communities
across the country might elicit federal moral and material
support for their localized development efforts.
Assessing the condition of our cities typically has involved
measuring, documenting, and inventorying these barriers one
by one, city by city.73 This view is fundamentally misguided.
The health care analogy breaks down here, because efforts to
view cities as patients, with the goal of designing remedial
strategies for treating each individually, inevitably prove
counterproductive. The result has been a conventional mindset
that would have us view our cities as concentrations of prob-
lems. The overall assessment of the state of urban America
70. Ames et al., supra note 18, at 198-99.
71. This is abundantly clear when examining HUD REPORT 1980, supra note 59.
This was the first such report which offered extensive empirical support documenting
the economic transformations besetting United States central cities, metropolitan
areas, and multistate regions. See also, e.g., BRADBURY ET AL., supra note 19, at 28-67
(describing the actual extent of urban decline based upon empirical data for the 53
largest cities).
72. See generally HUD REPORT 1980, supra note 59, at I-1 to 1-12 (summarizing
the 1978 urban policy process).
73. See generally id. at 11-1 to 11-14 (discussing how the federal government
supports cities).
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often has been uncritically equated with the sum of the prob-
lems which face individual cities.
Certainly, it is important to examine closely the unique
experiences and problems associated with individual cities.
There is more to urban development, however, than simply
understanding how resources-population, tax base, socio-
cultural groupings, and public and private capital-are being
reorganized within individual urban areas. At any one time,
individual urban areas function together as an urban system.
There is a considerable amount to be learned from examining
how individual urban areas relate to one another and how these
relationships change over time. While assessing the condition
of cities individually has obvious political appeal, it remains
seriously flawed.
Reorganization among parts of a national, and increasingly
global, urban system powerfully influences the potential for
redistribution of resources, growth, and development within
individual urban areas. While the prospects of larger urban
economic systems are shaped by the performances of individual
communities, we also must acknowledge that realistically the
global, national, and regional forces extending into local
economies from outside are very powerful and in many ways
establish outer bounds to the aspirations we might have for
individual cities. Increasingly, these forces channel the evolu-
tion of the economies of individual localities and thereby shape
the opportunities available to those who live there.
Tallying measurements on the conditions and performances
of individual cities- one by one does little to deepen our under-
standing of how the larger urban system is performing and how
it is being reorganized over time. Ultimately, assessing the
performance and condition of America's urban system requires
an arithmetic that goes beyond simply adding up the local
scores. It also involves the kind of subtraction reflected in
developments where growth in one part of the system precludes
comparable growth elsewhere. For example, while the United
States has developed major financial and industrial centers
through its history, the steady rise of Los Angeles as a world
financial center has to some extent come at the expense of New
York, just as the rise of Dallas as a center of advanced manu-
facturing has come partly at the expense of Detroit.74 In each
74. See Douglas E. Booth, Regional Long Waves and Urban Policy, 24 URB. STUD.
447,449-52 (1987) (arguing that industrial growth in various regions fluctuates above
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case, the experience in one city may look like decline even
though at a larger systems level it is not.
While the upgrading of the technical bases and even industry
mixes of local economies continues across the nation, the
unique recipes for success which have resulted in the Silicon
Valley in Northern California, the leisure-tourist complex in
Orlando, Florida, or the higher education complex in Greater
Boston, cannot be recreated through the exertion of any amount
of federal government effort. Many forms of investment
capital-physical, human, and financial-become self-perpe-
tuating. This is particularly true in regional complexes like the
legendary Silicon Valley in which technology-intensive indus-
tries are clustered. The resulting productivity advantages
create a strong pull on new investment, which in turn provides
high wages that reflect the occupational specialization capable
of being supported by a region's industry base. This, in turn,
attracts more such investment capital in all its forms which
accelerates new enterprise formation, rapid technology cycles
and transfer. The resulting economic metabolism of such
regions becomes an internal source of development and often
growth."5
IV., Do OUR CITIES STILL WORK?
Any answer to this question will have to involve assessments
of whether or not our urban areas-and the central cities at
their core-continue to demonstrate an ability to respond to the
world around them. If they have lost their capacities to do so,
then that would justify deep concern. Should the evidence
indicate that our urban arrangements have grown so incompat-
ible with the dominant features of our economic and cultural
and below the national average and that industrial growth activity shifts from region
to region); see also Donald A. Hicks, Geo-Industrial Shifts in Advanced Metropolitan
Economies, 24 URB. STUD. 460, 463-65 (1987) (arguing that there are regional
differences, but that in general, manufacturing-related employment is falling as the
industry becomes dominated by newer, research-driven industries and as older,
rekindled industries become increasingly capital intensive); Mitchell L. Moss, Tele-
communications, World Cities, and Urban Policy, 24 URB. STUD. 534, 540-44 (1987)
(arguing that the telecommunications industry strongly impacts the urban hierarchy
by imposing new demands on urban infrastructures that are different from those
imposed by the manufacturing industry).
75. For a review of recent related literature, see EDWARD J. MALECKI, TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THE DYNAMICS OF LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL CHANGE
(1991).
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arrangements that they hinder our prospects, or that they have
become islands of despair in a sea of prosperity, then a strong
case for federally initiated revitalization could perhaps be
made.
On the other hand, if our urban arrangements demonstrate
a continuing capacity to respond, and even to initiate or
accelerate, larger structural changes, such as the incubation
of new industries, job creation, rising education-mediated
wages, and rising real incomes, then the case for federal
intervention for the purpose of revitalizing urban areas is less
persuasive. Instead, it would suggest that problems of poverty
have more to do with the inability of the poor to gain access to
and derive benefits from what is happening around them, than
with some general decline of cities. The terrain of the debate
can then be narrowed to finding strategies aimed directly at
linking those left behind to opportunities offered today, instead
of seeking such goals indirectly through first attempting to
rejuvenate our cities.
Larger trends in a metropolitan area-dominated nation can-
not be ignored. The 1980s, characterized by a ninety-two month
economic expansion, was the setting for enormous broad-based
gains.76 Between 1982 and 1989, the nation's gross domestic
product (GDP) expanded by 31.1%, and real GDP per capita
rose 17.8% between 1980 and 1990.77 Capital investment
76. According to the Bureau of the Census, real average household income grew
for all income classes during the 1982-1989 period, compared to both the 1978-1982
and 1989-1990 periods during which real incomes declined across the board. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 202 (Current Population Reports, Consumer
Income, Series P-60, No. 174, 1991) (using 1990 CPI-U adjusted dollars). Levy and
Michel show that women's earnings, although lower than men's, grew more rapidly
than men's after 1979. FRANK S. LEVY & RICHARD C. MICHEL, THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF
AMERICAN FAMILIES: INCOME AND WEALTH TRENDS 18 (1991). They also reflect-through
the one-third decline in black poverty during 1982-1986-the powerful negative effect
of female-headed households on income gains. During the 1973-1986 period, the
income of households headed by black females actually declined 9.2%, while the income
of those headed by white females increased 5.1%. Id. at 40. In general, minority
populations benefitted broadly from the economic growth of the 1980s. During the
1982-1986 period, median black family income rose 14%: While 28% of all black fami-
lies-both single and two parent-were officially designated as "poor" families, only
10.8% of two-parent black families were below the poverty threshold. Kate W.
O'Beirne, U.S. Income Data: Good Numbers Hiding Excellent News, BACKGROUNDER
(Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 19, 1988.
77. Donald A. Hicks & John Rees, Cities and Beyond: A New Look at the Nation's
Urban Economy, in REDISCOVERING URBAN AMERICA, supra note 15, at 2-1, 2-3.
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soared, new business formation surged, and manufacturing
output and productivity made sharp gains."s
How did this broad economic growth register in America's
urban areas? Vulnerability to business cycle fluctuations were
distributed unevenly across urban areas during both the 1970s
and the early 1980s. 9 On measures of income growth, non-
metropolitan areas were more vulnerable to downturns in the
economy than were metropolitan areas, suburbs more so than
central cities."s When unemployment rates are considered,
however, central cities were more vulnerable than the suburban
areas. For that reason, if for no other, the extended expansion
during the 1980s was relatively kind to our major cities.
Therefore, if central cities were more vulnerable to unemploy-
ment than suburbs during recessionary periods, then the
extended expansion of the 1980s tended to hold down the unem-
ployment experienced by central cities to levels below what they
would have experienced had the economy not expanded so
dramatically during the 1980s.8 ' In fact, the 1980s saw a
marked abatement of unemployment: national unemployment
fell from 10.8% in December 1982 to 6.1% eight years later.
8 2
Even with the brief and mild recession of the early 1990s, the
unemployment rate during the spring of 1992 was only 7.6%.3
Meanwhile, in the wake of a return to urbanization, both
population and employment growth surged inside our urban
areas during the 1980s.84 Fully 90.1% of the decade's popula-
tion growth took place inside our metropolitan areas, up
sharply from 73.4% during the previous decade.8 5 By 1990,
77.7% of Americans resided in the more than three hundred
78. Id. at 2-3, 2-4.
79. See George E. Peterson, Urban Policy and the Cyclical Behavior of Cities, in
REAGAN AND THE CITIES 11, 14-15 (George E. Peterson & Carol W. Lewis eds., 1986).
80. Id. at 14-15, 17-18.
81. Analyses of the influence of business cycles on measures of urban economic
performance can be found in the following articles: Marie Howland,Age of Capital and
Regional Business Cycles, GROWTH & CHANGE, Apr. 1984, at 29; Marie Howland &
George E. Peterson, The Response of City Economies to National Business Cycles, 23
J. URB. ECON. 71 (1988); Donald Manson et al., The Effects of Business Cycles on
Metropolitan Suburbanization, 60 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 71 (1984); Paul Waddell & Vibhooti
Shukla, Employment Dynamics, Spatial Restructuring, and the Business Cycle, 25
GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 35 (1993).
82. Hicks & Rees, supra note 77, at 2-3.
83. Id.
84. For a discussion of this trend, see William H. Frey, People in Places: Demo-
graphic Trends in Urban America, in REDISCOVERING URBAN AMERICA, supra note 15,
at 3-1, 3-7.
85. Hicks & Rees, supra note 77, at 2-1, 2-4.
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metropolitan areas.8 6 Moreover, of the more than nineteen
million new jobs added during the 1980s, 87.2% were added
inside the metropolitan areas, up from 80.8% during the
1970s.8 7 By 1990, 80.8% of the nation's employment was lo-
cated in metropolitan areas."8
In addition, the nation's largest urban areas revealed a solid
capacity to create new jobs. In urban areas with populations
greater than one million during the 1980s, employment growth
proceeded at a rate faster than that for the nation at-large.
8 9
Geographically, however, this employment growth was dis-
tributed very unevenly. The Los Angeles metropolitan area
accounted for approximately ten percent of the decade's
metropolitan employment growth, and the top ten metropolitan
areas accounted for forty-four percent.90
How did this growth affect economic disparities across urban
areas? Using an index measure of resident need that combines
rates of poverty, unemployment, and income growth, the
evidence from the 1980s suggests that this process of presumed
urban decline, feared irreversible in the 1970s, was anything
but that.9 The majority of the most severely distressed cities
in the 1970s had improved by 1990, largely because during the
1980s, employment growth in these cities outpaced population
growth.92
It should be emphasized that the problem in such areas is
not necessarily an overall shortage of jobs. Overall, num-
bers of private sector jobs per city resident have actually
risen over the years in most central cities .... Jobs per
resident have increased in all types of big cities, including
high need cities. As of 1990, there were about as many
private jobs per resident in high need, declining cities as in
low need, growing places.93
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2-6 to 2-7.
88. Id. at 2-7.
89. Id. at 2-67.
90. Id. at 2-28 to 2-29. The Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas include
in order: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Houston, Boston, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Cleveland. Id. at 2-98.
91. See Franklin J. James, Urban Economies: Trends, Forces and Implications
for the President's National Urban Policy (Feb. 15, 1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 29-30 (emphasis added).
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This surge in employment growth in America's urban areas
during the 1980s reflected dominant structural developments
as well. The private sector dominated the decade's employment
creation.94 Service industries expanded their employment by
3 1.1% in the 1980s, while goods-producing industries expanded
by only 1.1%.95 As a result, the goods-production share of urban
employment declined from 27.6% in 1970 to 20.3% in 1990.96
It appears that our cities, including many of our older
industrial ones judged during the 1970s to be permanently
disadvantaged by larger structural changes in the economy,
responded to the 1980s in ways that led to rising levels of
population, employment, and income. That this turnaround
was not universal is probably due to the special industrial and
demographic circumstances defining particular places rather
than to the categorical weakening of our cities.9"
A. Do Our Cities Still Work for the Poor?
While this nation's cities, central as well as suburban,
continue to appear responsive to dominant cyclical and struc-
tural influences, has that responsiveness extended to the poor
living in them?
On the surface, the long-term trends look discouraging.
Complex barriers block access to opportunities for many urban
residents, and central cities appear to have become increasing-
ly the province of the poor. In the quarter century between
1959 to 1985, the share of the nation's poor residing in central
94. Private sector employment growth (24.1%) was nearly double that of public
sector employment growth (12.5%). Hicks & Rees, supra note 77, at 2-65. By 1990,
84.6% of all urban jobs were in the private sector, up from 81.8% in 1970. Id. at 2-66.
95. Id. at 2-65.
96. Id. at 2-66.
97. While this rebound was evident by examining conventional indicators, it is
also true that the usefulness of some of these indicators was diminishing. Ironically,
over the same period, employment growth per se was losing its capacity to define the
overall economic well-being of an urban area. Indeed, the 1980s offered clear evidence
that simple employment growth could well impoverish a region. Increasingly the
quality, rather than the quantity, ofemployment determined an urban area's economic
fortunes. See Donald A. Hicks & Steven R. Nivin, The Tertiary Crisis Revisited:
Regional Restructuring and Economic Performance (Nov. 11-14, 1993) (paper
presented at the Annual Regional Science Association International Meetings in
Houston, Texas) (draft on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
see also Hicks & Rees, supra note 77, at 2-40 to 2-45 (using Dallas as a case study to
examine employment growth more closely).
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cities rose from twenty-seven percent to forty-three percent.98
It is on the strength of this trend that the tight linkage be-
tween central cities and poverty has been firmly fixed in the
public view.
But is this discouraging conclusion entirely justified? That
our central cities house substantial shares of the nation's poor
should no more imply that they are failing than should the fact
that a majority of all deaths take place in hospitals today
indicates that our hospitals are failing. After all, for most of
this century, rural areas were associated with poverty, and
cities were associated with opportunities of all kinds. These
opportunities lured many generations to our cities from rural
areas, the South, and from abroad. Many of these same mil-
lions, or their offspring, continued this journey even as it has
led to the suburbs.9 9 Central cities, rather than rural areas,
became the staging ground for millions of individual quests for
prosperity. That not all poor have found success-or that some
may never do so-is no more an indictment of our cities than
it would have been for our rural areas decades ago.
Moreover, the circumstances of poverty appear to remain
broadly responsive to dominant economic and social forces.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the long-term
poverty trend has been downward. i00 During the 1960s alone,
and before the official declaration of the War on Poverty,
poverty rates were almost cut in half.'0 ' Progress on this front
stagnated during the late 1960s and 1970s; ironically, this
occurred even as massive federal spending programs targeted
at the eradication of poverty were commenced.0 2 Then, in the
wake of tax cuts during the 1980s, including the systematic
removal from the tax rolls of six million poor families, and the
nation's longest peacetime economic expansion of the century,
poverty resumed its decline until the recession in 1990.'03
More recently, the cyclical influences on poverty have become
evident. From the depths of the severe double-dip recession of
98. John D. Kasarda, Inner-City Poverty and Economic Access, in REDISCOVERING
URBAN AMERICA, supra note 15, at 4-2.
99. For a discussion of the historical sequencing of population dispersal across
several spatial scales, see HICKS, supra note 24, at 113-52.
100. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMMERCE, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1990, at 3 (Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No.
175, 1991).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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the early 1980s, the overall United States poverty rate rose
steadily, peaking at 15.2% in 1984.104 As the rapid recovery and
extended expansion continued, however, the national poverty
rate steadily declined, reaching 12.8% by 1989.105 With the
economic downturn at the end of the 1980s, poverty rose again,
reaching 14.2% in 1991.'06 Even so, poverty rates exceed the
national level only in smaller and nonmetropolitan areas of the
South and West.1
0 7
Despite the multiple and complex linkages between poverty
and place, our central cities may have begun to lose their hold
on poverty. No longer can our inner cities be considered the
special province of poverty, as suburban areas increasingly
house the poor.0 8 Increasingly, poverty appears to have a
dynamic of its own that is no longer inextricably confined to
our inner cities in the way that it was during the 1970s.
B. Do Our Cities Work for
the Ghetto Poor?"°9
Poverty derives much of its destructive power when it is
concentrated. 110 The special form of poverty that is bound up
with race and ethnicity is relatively concentrated in poor
communities. During the 1980s, more than half of the United
States' minority population growth was concentrated in just
nine metropolitan areas,"' and roughly half of the ghetto poor
resided in just ten metropolitan areas.112 Consequently, while
104. James, supra note 91, at 3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Frey, supra note 84, at 3-28.
108. Ames et al., supra note 18, at 205 ("By 1990, 42% of all metropolitan poor
lived in the suburbs.").
109. The "poor' are not confined to any particular geography. The "urban poor"
are those poor in our nation's urban areas, or metropolitan areas including central
cities and suburbs. The term "ghetto poor" should be used here because its members
constitute a subset of both the poor and the urban poor based on circumstances which
can be traced at least partly to their cultural isolation.
110. Kasarda, supra note 98, at 4-3 to 4-11.
111. Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Miami, Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth,
Washington, D.C., San Diego, and Chicago. Frey, supra note 84, at 3-22, 3-83.
Moreover, more than one-third of the nation's metropolitan areas remained over 90%
white. Id. at 3-3.
112. William H. Frey, Metropolitan America: Beyond the Transition, POPULATION
BULL., July 1990, at 1, 37 ("The majority of the nation's concentrated poverty house-
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much of the vulnerability to poverty can be described in
aspatial terms, what can we say about the special circumstanc-
es of poor people, especially the minority poor, in poor places?
This question shifts the focus from poverty per se to the
persistence of poverty in specific places and to the factors that
tighten the grip of poor places on people so that they either
remain poor or become poor.
As the place-related correlates of poverty came to shape our
understanding of urban poverty, the prevailing view had been
that the spatial dimension of poverty, especially its concen-
tration, primarily is responsible for magnifying poverty's
debilitating effects. Today, however, it is not just poverty's
concentration but also its increasing dispersion with which we
must contend.
113
1. The Shifting Footprint of Urban Poverty-The share of
metropolitan black population living in neighborhoods in which
the poverty rate was at least 40% increased from 20.2% in 1980
to 23.7% in 1990, while the proportion of poor blacks in these
neighborhoods increased from 37.2% to 45.4%.114 The tie
between blacks, and especially black poor, and declining urban
neighborhoods seemingly tightened. In large part, however,
this was due to the fact that the number of census tracts
classified as ghettos increased fifty-four percent between 1980
and 1990.15 As a result, minority residents-even when able
to move to the suburbs-were being overtaken by the rapid ex-
pansion of the newly classified ghettos.
While urban poverty remained more concentrated in central
cities than elsewhere during the 1980s, poverty actually in-
creased more rapidly in the suburban areas than in central
holds are located in only about 10 of the largest central cities."). These areas ordered
by descending share are: New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, McAllen-Pharr-
Edinburg (Tex.), Memphis, New Orleans, Newark, Detroit, and Los Angeles. These
areas are CMSAs (Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas) as officially defined
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Executive Office of the President.
113. While the poverty population in the nation's largest central cities has thinned
out in some census tracts and increased in others, the number of census tracts defined
as "poverty,' "extreme poverty," and "underclass" increased steadily throughout the
1970-1990 period. Kasarda, supra note 98, at 4-39 to 4-40.
114. Paul A. Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 288, 289-91 (1994). Beneath this aggregate trend, however, lies
significant variation. Although this general trend was evident in two-thirds of the
nation's metropolitan areas, in the remaining one-third the proportion of black
residents living in ghettos declined. Id. at 295.
115. "Ghetto" is not an official Census Bureau term. It is defined in multiple ways
by scholars who study especially-concentrated poverty. Both Kasarda and Jargowsky
discuss their multiple criteria for the definition in their respective studies. See, e.g.,
Kasarda, supra note 98, at 4-3 to 4-4; Jargowsky, supra note 114, at 290-91.
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cities. 116 While the notion of spatial mismatch between the
existence of and the need for jobs continued to account for
much inner-city poverty among minority populations, the
minority poor were no longer landlocked inside central cities.
Indeed, while many believed that minority poor were at a
permanent disadvantage because they could not exploit the
opportunities made available by suburbanization, in many
senses this view lagged behind reality.
No longer did the suburbanization dynamic so simply rein-
force a black-white racial divide. During the 1970s, central city
blacks began to move into the suburbs against heavy odds.
1 7
By the 1980s, vaguely reminiscent of the more massive migra-
tion of southern blacks to northern industrial cities earlier in
the century, that movement accelerated."' During the 1980s,
and in all regions of the country, blacks, along with Asians and
Hispanics, suburbanized." 9 While the numbers remained
relatively small, the growth rate of minority populations in the
suburbs began to exceed that of whites. 20
While more well-to-do blacks led the way, they were not
alone. 2' Even though poor blacks and other minorities often
remained in older central cities, many others successfully
moved out.122 Importantly, recent suburbanization patterns
suggest that a racial divide is not being exchanged for a class-
based one. Migration flows from central cities are not limited
to higher-income minorities. While the destinations within
those suburbs are often different and in no way indicate that
suburbs are a setting for dramatic residential integration by
race, blacks from all income categories are managing to leave
inner-city neighborhoods behind.
21
116. Jargowsky, supra note 114, at 296.
117. See Frey, supra note 84, at 3-31. Indicative of the way in which education and
income (or social class) have come to eclipse race as the principal steering factor,
interstate migration patterns of black college graduates were more likely to resemble
those of well-educated whites than of the black poor. See William H. Frey, Black
College Grads, Those in Poverty Take Different Migration Paths, POPULATION TODAY,
Feb. 1994, at 1-2.
118. Frey, supra note 84, at 3-32.
119. Id. at 3-33.
120. Id. at 3-21 to 3-22.
121. On race and class dimensions of suburbanization, see Reynolds Farley,
Residential Segregation of Social and Economic Groups among Blacks, 1970-80, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 274, 283-93 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1991) (discussing race and class dimensions of suburbanization).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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2. The Decline in Residential Segregation-If the key to
ghetto poverty is pervasive residential segregation, 2 4 then
there is reason for modest optimism. During the 1980s, black-
white residential segregation declined in 204 of 232, or 88% of
metropolitan areas. 125 Moreover, with the exception of Detroit
it declined in all forty-seven metropolitan areas with popula-
tions in 1990 of one million or more.'26 Declining residential
segregation, however, often does not necessarily imply declin-
ing social segregation.1
27
The social restructuring of poor neighborhoods has begun to
challenge our conventional understanding of the link between
race, place, and poverty. Galster and Mincy have reported that
during 1979-1989, the number of whites in high-poverty areas
increased by twenty-nine percent while the number of blacks
declined by twenty percent. 21 Shifts of this kind turn our
attention to the larger forces of economic restructuring. "De-
clining employment prospects in any neighborhood-regardless
of racial or ethnic majorities-leads to a higher poverty rate." 29
Such shifts in both circumstances and the locational features
of urban poverty, demonstrate the continued responsiveness
124. Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass, 96 AM. J. SOC. 329, 354 (1990).
125. Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Latino, Asian, and Black Segregation in
Multi-Ethnic Metro Areas: Findings from the 1990 Census 9 (Population Studies
Center, University of Michigan, Res. Rep. No. 93-278, 1993). Over the 1980s, Latino
segregation increased in 52% and Asian segregation increased in 74% of the areas.
Id. at 2.
126. For a discussion of segregation in Detroit, see Reynolds Farley et al., Contin-
ued Racial Residential Segregation in Detroit: 'Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs'
Revisited, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 1, 2 (1993).
127. Jargowsky, supra note 114, at 288-89. Using a Neighborhood Sorting Index
(NSI) to measure and monitor economic segregation in inner-city neighborhoods,
Jargowsky reports steady increases in segregation among all racial and ethnic groups
during the 1980s, with those for blacks and Hispanics especially rapid. See Paul A.
Jargowsky, Take the Money and.Run: Economic Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas (May 13, 1994) (paper presented to the IRP-ASPE Poverty Research Seminar
Series, Small Grants Research Seminar, Washington, D.C.) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Nevertheless, at a more intimate level, some
progress is indicated. Interracial marriages more than tripled from 310,000 to 994,000
between 1970 and 1991, with black-white marriages increasing 355% from 65,000 in
1970 to 231,000 in 1991. ARLENE F. SALUTER, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIvING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1991, at 6-7 (Current
Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 261, 1992). The
report qualifies this result, however, because the 1991 survey is based on a much
smaller sample as compared to the 1970 data. Id.
128. Poverty in Urban Neighborhoods, URB. INST. POL'Y & RES. REP., Fall 1993, at
11, 11-13 (discussing the research of George C. Galster and Ronald B. Mincy).
129. Id. at 12.
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of urban poverty to broader economic influences. The evidence
suggests that as inner cities loosened their poverty grip on
their residents during the 1980s, the more conventional under-
standing of the relationship between urban poverty and the
urban underclass began to shift.
Even as inner-city conditions worsened, many poor residents
were able to leave. 3 ° Despite the prevailing cultural imagery
of the growing calcification within our urban neighborhoods
and the fear that its residents are generally so insulated from
larger trends that they have been rendered prosperity-proof,
available evidence suggests otherwise.
The benefits of economic expansion can indeed trickle down
to the poor, even those residing in some of our nation's most
desperate inner cities. In recent research on underclass poverty
in urban ghettos, Paul Jargowsky has documented a remarkable
responsiveness of ghettos and many of those who live in them
to the economic expansion of the 1980s. 131 As job markets
strengthened, poverty among inner-city black Americans was
reduced substantially. 132 This suggests not only that spatial
bounds of ghettos are capable of both expanding and contracting,
but also that broad economic growth can extricate the once-poor
from harsh circumstances, a process revealed in declining inner-
city population densities.'33 It further suggests that despite the
fact that family and community-related dysfunction can increase
the incidence of poverty, any resulting urban culture need not
necessarily preclude dramatic rises in the economic status of
resident minorities of poor communities. 3 4
If we seek to improve the lives of and expand opportunities
for those in the so-called urban underclass, we should begin by
130. This was true during the 1970s as well as the 1980s. See Edward Gramlich
et al., Moving Into and Out of Poor Urban Areas, 11 J. POLy ANALYSIS & MGMT. 273,
281-83 (1992); Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary J. Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United
States, 1970-1980, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 121, at 235, 252-53.
131. See Jargowsky, supra note 114, at 303.
132. Kasarda, supra note 98, at 4-1, 4-5 to 4-10.
133. Id.
134. In a study of the longitudinal adjustments of a portfolio of 10 major urban
areas distributed across all United States census regions, Kasarda has reported that
the spread of urban poverty across central-city census tracts was generally more
vigorous during the 1970s than during the 1980s. During the 1970s, the proportion
of central-city census tracts characterized by relatively high rates of poverty increased
in all cities in his sample, especially in older industrial cities of the Northeast and
Midwest. During the 1980s, by contrast, poverty's footprint actually contracted in two
cities, New York and Atlanta, while its pace slowed in older industrial cities and
quickened in major Southern cities. Id. at 4-5 to 4-11.
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recognizing that an expanding economy remains a potent policy
tool. The central debate during the 1980s over the determinants
of urban poverty focused on the role of welfare as a system of
distorted incentives versus the restructuring of the urban
economy: This was a valid concern for certain segments of the
ghetto poverty population. The debate, however, was misguided
to the extent that it overlooked the importance of broader eco-
nomic conditions.
V. THE POVERTY OF POVERTY POLICY
Our cities continue to reveal an impressive actual and
potential capacity to link people with opportunity. As the
experiences of the 1980s reveal, even inner-city ghettos may
be penetrated by sustained economic growth.13 For many
people, however, moving up has meant moving out.'36 The irony
of this dynamic is that such instances of success are not
reflected directly in urban poverty accounting schema. 3 7 Inner-
city ghettos are unlikely ever to register gains in economic
growth on the conventional indicators. Indeed, as inner-city
ghettos remain the home to those who cannot or have not yet
been able to move up, the aggregate condition of poor places
actually will decline as the more successful steadily escape
them.
At the core of much-though by no means all-of today's
ghetto poverty lies the growing irrelevance of employment and
related opportunities more so than their absence. While an
expanding economy continues to extricate large numbers of
urban poor from poverty, a large and growing share of the
ghetto poor are beyond its reach. Much of this can be traced to
ill-conceived post-World War II poverty policy. Past efforts
predicated on notions of assisting poor people within their
communities have so concentrated and incentivized ghetto
poverty that we have ended up unintentionally producing more
of it. Moreover, the forms and conditions of this assistance have
tended to encourage the proliferation of the economically
135. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
136. See Gramlich et al., supra note 130, at 281-83.
137. Id. at 284; Kasarda, supra note 98, at 4-5 to 4-10.
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marginal and unemployable. A spiral of individual and institu-
tional deficits has created in their wake distorted world views
and dysfunctional behaviors that have undermined the abilities
of schools, churches, communities, and families to serve as
springboards to improved economic prospects. As a result, they
perpetuate a culture that breeds a variety of problem popula-
tions that lie beyond the reach of today's cities, and perhaps
those of any era.
By emphasizing primarily the poverty-pooling function of our
cities, however, we often have created the impression that our
cities no longer work as they once did. We have diverted
attention away from more fundamental questions concerning
what poverty is and how its expression may have transformed
over time. Therefore, it is useful to examine the larger histori-
cal context within which our cities have functioned to create
and distribute prosperity.
[Miost "poor" Americans today are better housed, better
fed, and own more personal property than average Ameri-
cans throughout most of the century .... [11n 1991, the per
capita expenditures of the lowest income one-fifth of the
U.S. population exceeded the per capita income of the
average American household in 1960, after adjusting for
inflation. 1
38
As much as we may have come to despair about the persistence
of urban poverty during recent decades, there is little in the
impulses behind past national urban policy agendas to remind
us of the remarkable gains that have been made. It has been
precisely during the post-1950s era, as urban arrangements
have been reshaped and extended, that such broad welfare
gains have been made. 3 9 For this reason, it is difficult to see
138. Robert Rector, The Facts About America's Poor, F.Y.I. (Heritage Found.,
Washington, D.C.), Dec. 23, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Rector, The Facts]; see Robert
Rector et al., How "Poor" Are America's Poor, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found.,
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 21, 1990, at 2 [hereinafter Rector et al., How "Poor"]. In
addition, there is much justifiable concern that the conceptual focus of official Census
Bureau poverty measures rendered them less useful in understanding general welfare.
Official measures of family income do not include in-kind government benefits such
as food stamps and housing aid, undercount income derived from the underground
economy, and ignore household assets. For a discussion of some of these deficiencies,
see Rector, The Facts, supra, at 4-5; Rector et al., How 'Poor", supra, at 3-7.
139. HICKS, supra note 24, at 2-4.
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how suburbanization and related urban developments have
disadvantaged the nation. We routinely lose track of this
reality, partially because the meaning of poverty has changed
just as surely as have its determinants.
A. Rethinking Urban Poverty
When we ask who are the poor, it is often as though we seek
to identify some discrete group "out there" whose membership
can be defined and bounded. In a broader sense, however,
potentially we all are the poor. As the footprint of poverty
expands, it is becoming clearer that at any one time, many of
us, regardless of where we live, are one pink slip, divorce
decree, death certificate, or severe health problem away from
slipping into the ranks of poverty, however temporarily.14 °
There are junctures in the lives of most people when they are
more vulnerable to falling into the official ranks of the poor
than at other times.
Perhaps the most fundamental reality about poverty, then,
is that the ranks of the poor are ever in motion.4 This is
evident in both longer and shorter time frames. There is
substantial intergenerational turnover within poverty ranks.142
Much of that involves substantial income mobility. A study
based on The University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income
Dynamics reported evidence of substantial upward and down-
ward mobility. Fifty-six percent of the persons in the lowest
income category in 1967 had escaped to a higher income
category by 1976.143 Meanwhile, forty-eight percent of those in
the highest income category in 1967 moved to a lower income
category by 1976."' In addition, virtually the same shifts oc-
curred between 1977 and 1986.145 When individuals are fol-
lowed over time, an even more important trend emerges.
Across the 1967-1986 period, the poor grew richer faster than
140. See Ames et al., supra note 18, at 205-06.
141. Isabel V. Sawhill & Mark Condon, Is US. Income Inequality Really Growing?,
POLICY BITES (Urban Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 1992, at 1, 1-4. For a similar study
from the 1970s, see GREGORY J. DUNCAN ET AL., YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY: THE
CHANGING ECONOMIC FUTURES OF AMERICAN WORKERS AND FAMILIES (1984).
142. Sawhill & Condon, supra note 141,.at 2-3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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did the rich.14 Moreover, according to analyses of Census
Bureau data, considerable intragenerational churning is also
evident. Each year during the 1984-1988 period alone, approxi-
mately seventeen percent of those in the lowest quintile moved
up the following year.
147
Who then are the urban poor? Typically, they are those who
by virtue of relative youth or old age, labor force inexperience
or dislocation, or changing marital status are at least tempo-
rarily unable to negotiate the urban economy. Their stay in a
poverty status may well be extended or exacerbated by other
factors related to their residence, but, as we have seen, those
settings increasingly involve suburbs as well as inner-city and
rural areas.'48 While formidable roadblocks to educational,
employment, or marital avenues out of personal poverty often
may confront city residents, it is not justified to suggest that
our cities cause the poverty of their residents.
Part of the reality of poverty is that it is not simply a set of
circumstances to which only some people are vulnerable. At
any one time, the bulk of the poor are people simply passing
through. 149 While such life events often are unavoidable, there
are many individuals and families whose prospects for re-
bounding from poverty episodes are especially low. It is on
these individuals and families that the bulk of our efforts
should be focused.
B. Poverty As Income Inequality
The search for ways to alleviate the incidence and duration
of poverty often is confused with the quest for income
equality. 50 Because urban areas almost by definition register
146. Id. at 1-2.
147. Bruce Bartlett, A Class Structure That Won't Stay Put, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
1991, at A16.
148. See supra Part IV.B.1.
149. This parallels the vulnerability associated with losing or not having health
insurance in the current health care reform debate. "Most are temporarily uninsured:
almost half of those without coverage regain it within four months, and 75% within
a year. A majority are low-wage workers who are either self-employed or working for
small, low-margin businesses." Ann R. Dowd, Fixing Clinton's Health Care Plan,
FORTUNE, Apr. 4, 1994, at 83, 85.
150. Indeed, the general quest for equality of a broader sort faces enormous
barriers of an even more fundamental nature. In a recent address, Charles Murray
noted:
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spatially a variety of dimensions of inequality, the "problems"
associated with our urban areas appear to take on a special
urgency. As with the nature of poverty itself, however, the
notion of income inequality needs closer examination.
Empirical evidence suggests that income inequality measured
at the level of individuals and households increased during the
1980s. 15' While this increase may have symbolic significance,
against the background of the entire post-World War II period,
the degree of increase actually has been very slight.'52 The
decade's economic expansion explains part of it. In a larger
context, cyclical gains and losses seldom are distributed
uniformly. There are always enterprises, industries and
occupations, and households and regions that are more vulner-
able to economic downturns and more likely to benefit from
subsequent recoveries than others. It is constantly unequal
rates of change that lie beneath urban development dynamics.
Within that context we can see that the cyclical trends of the
1980s tended to accelerate and increase the visibility of a
number of extant development patterns.
What else accounted for this shift in income equality?
According to Frank Levy, shifting patterns of household
[O]ur worst social problems do not strike randomly. About half of those in
poverty, for example,. have IQs under ninety. About three-quarters of high school
dropouts have IQs under ninety. The average IQ of convicted felons is about
ninety-two. About a third of the mothers of illegitimate children have IQs of
eighty and under....
For most of the twentieth century, government has tried to create the equality
of condition that society has neglected to produce on its own.
Charles Murray, The Ideal of Equality, the Reality of Difference, Address at the
Bradley Lecture Series, American Enterprise Institute (Apr. 11, 1994).
151. Indeed, from a longer-term perspective, income inequality among families
generally rose during the 1969-1989 period. See Lynn Karoly, The Trend in Inequality
among Families, Individuals, and Workers in the United States: A Twenty-Five Year
Perspective, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 19,27 (Sheldon Danziger
& Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993). Because wage data do not cover government workers
or the self-employed, however, they do not provide a definitive picture of income
trends. Analyses of Social Security data indicate that during the 1980s, after-inflation
wages actually grew from $17,092 to $18,778, for an average annual increase of 1.1%.
Robert J. Myers, Real Wages Went Up in the 1980s, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1990, at A14.
Moreover, unpublished analyses of Commerce Department data on real per capita
personal disposable income rose 41% during 1970-1990. Living Well, FORTUNE, Oct.
7, 1991, at 188. From a very different perspective, examination of consumption data
indicates that per capita consumer spending rose 21% during both the 1970s and the
1980s. Id.
152. FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS: THE CHANGING AMERICAN INCOME DISTRIBU-
TION 14, 227-29 (1987).
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structure, together with wage stagnation and decline since
1973 were largely responsible.'53 Indeed, an estimated eighty-
eight percent of income inequality was tied to purely
demographic shifts, with only the remaining twelve percent
due to policy-manipulable variables such as macroeconomic
activity.' Income inequality could be expected to increase as
the proportion of young and female workers, who commanded
lower wages by virtue of their relative work inexperience,
increased. This increase, however, also could be expected to be
transitory. 55 As these workers continue to gain experience,
successive smaller cohorts of labor force entrants appear, and
wages recover, income inequalities might be expected to settle
back to pre-1980s levels.
In the end, judging America's cities by the absence of pov-
erty and disparity on all manner of economic indices is mis-
guided. Our cities succeed if they are able to move individuals
and households through poverty over time. Failure involves
neither the existence of poverty populations nor even the
perpetual existence of poverty areas in our cities. Rather,
failure is evident when people are permanently stranded in
poverty or prevented from deriving benefits from urban de-
velopment processes. Although it is abundantly clear that this
stagnation describes the circumstances of many Americans
today, it is far from clear that our cities are predominantly to
blame.
VI. BEYOND CITIES: SHOULD WE RENEW AN EFFORT TO
DEVELOP A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY?
Today the greatest shares of this nation's wealth and wel-
fare are created in and distributed through our expansive
urban economy. By focusing on individual communities and
the changes they exhibit, though, one can easily lose sight of
153. Id. at 196-99, 204-07. "The most striking development is in families' connec-
tions to the economy .... In the top two quintiles, 60 percent of all families now
have two earners. In the bottom quintile 44 percent of families now have no earner."
Id. at 198.
154. Joseph H. Haslag et al., The Haves and Have-Nots: A Study of Income
Inequality, SOUTHWEST ECON. (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas), Sept.-Oct., 1992, at
1, 3.
155. LEVY, supra note 152, at 208 ("If wages begin to grow again, the issue of the
vanishing middle class will itself vanish.").
SPRING AND SUMMER 1994]
the importance of the relationships that bind communities
together and that transmit changes experienced in one place
to countless places elsewhere throughout the urban system. 156
One's view of the nation's larger urban system easily can be
obscured by the more visible and more salient features of its
individual cities. Integral to an urban economy is the ability
of the larger system to make spatial adjustments, to disinvest
in some places as surely and as flexibly as it invests in others.
It is unwise to limit our attention to changes underway within
specific places, because "place" itself is a. large part of the
flexibility of larger urban economic change. We also must ex-
plore the changes that are taking place among places as well.
The development of the nation's urban economic system rests
as much on the patterns of shifting assignments it makes
among settlements as it does on the transformations internal
to specific settlements. 5 7
Does the United States need a "national urban policy"?
Could an explicit urban policy be a convenient way of orga-
nizing many aspects of social policy by fixing such policies to
real places, or is there a reason to identify urban places as
something separate that demand our public attention? Do any
public initiatives called for by a national urban policy hold the
promise of expanding individual opportunities while at the
same time facilitating the continuing transformation of the
nation's urban economies? Or would such a policy focus tend
to increase the friction of such developments or be used subtly
to justify the allocation of public resources to efforts seeking
to retard or reverse these developments?
To date, conventional national urban policy reports have
tended to focus on the fates and fortunes of specific places.'58
The unstated assumption has been that each place has an
autonomy that must somehow be respected by national, and
even global, patterns of development and change.'59 In the
eyes of many, the proper federal role in urban policy is some-
how to be a broad advocate for all places and all people.
Conventional policy urges that federal responsibility should be
156. For a discussion of the development of the United States system of cities, see
THIERRY J. NoYELLE & THOMAS M. STANBACK, JR., THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN CITIES (1983).
157. See supra Part III.B.
158. Id.
159. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 71-86.
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defined as assisting individual communities to realize their
individual and localized goals of growth and development. 60
The guiding assumptions made by this view are insupport-
able. The wisdom of this policy tack is belied by all evidence
of how real economies perform and transform over time.
161
Places, and people in places, are ever "in play" as the devel-
opment of larger economic systems proceeds. Had a poll been
taken as part of our first official census in 1790, it is unlikely
that the residents of this new nation would have opted to
leave their land and homesteads and migrate physically to
new places or psychically to new notions of community, new
arrangements for wealth creation, or new arrangements for
security. They did not view themselves as being on an inevi-
table journey into cities and urban areas of the future. Yet,
over time, that is precisely what happened and will always
continue to happen. The destinations will change, but the
journeys will continue.
Any federal government presence in urban policy, whether
or not in the form of an explicitly articulated national urban
policy, must recognize that the locational features of residence
and economic activity are pliant and can be expected to change
over time. The spatial arrangements of a nation's people and
its economic activities will reflect new developments in cultural
values, new visions of the desirable among distributed opportu-
nities, and new enabling technologies. 1 2 Neither the architec-
* tural, industrial, nor land use features of urban America in the
1950s and 1960s embodied an urban ideal. Rather, the great
virtue of urban America in any era always has been the relative
ease with which it could shift from one settlement pattern to
another as circumstances permitted or required. 6 3 A national
urban policy cannot avoid the presumption that it is proper to
array the moral and fiscal authority of the federal government
against such transitions. It is precisely this adaptability which
has delivered the United States over the past two centuries to
its present position of ever-rising wealth and unsurpassed
living standards. This suggests that relatively unrestricted
mobility of capital in all its forms-human, material, and
160. Id.
161. See discussion supra Part II.
162. The basic theme of the plasticity of urban arrangements is developed in HICKS,
supra note 24, at 113-52; Donald A. Hicks, 'Plastic Land" in the Post-Industrial Era,
2 CATO J. 437, 437-68 (1982).
163. Hicks, supra note 162, at 40.
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financial-is critical to economic development and adjustment.
Like any recombinant phenomenon, opportunity and innovative
possibility should be permitted to emerge spontaneously.
Because both people and places are in transit incessantly, the
defining feature of settlement patterns has come to be expres-
sions of the fluidity of economic and cultural change, rather
than monuments to some bygone era deemed more alluring
than it ever really was.
The goal should instead be to expand the number of options
available to Americans and enable choices among these options,
while doing what is necessary to help people and places navi-
gate these transitions. Federal policy stances should not be
used to attempt to insulate either people or places from the
changes each inflict on the other.
National interests no longer can be easily reconciled with
local ones. No longer can it be considered in the nation's best
interests to overlook the long-term gains associated with people
and their resources moving between jobs and communities, and
urban areas exchanging older economic bases for newer ones.
Far greater concern should be reserved for those who for
whatever reasons are unable to participate fully in these
developments through which both the larger economy and
society continuously revitalize and reorder themselves.
Some of these adjustments undoubtedly present daunting
challenges to specific places in the form of rapid population or
employment loss or gain.164 While changes can be disruptive,
the national responsibility is to facilitate these adjustments by
removing barriers and mitigating their more disruptive impacts
on individuals and communities. The essence of the federal
response, however, will come in the form of policies that are
not explicitly "urban" and are instead characterized by the
absence of explicit spatially-sensitive interventions. It is
becoming increasingly apparent that the more substantive
contributions that the federal government can make to the
prospects of our cities and their residents involve interventions
early on in the causal sequences that specify how urban areas
create and distribute opportunities. These contributions include
commitments to macroeconomic policies that encourage invest-
ment and growth, regulatory policies that encourage flexible
164. Specific environmental costs associated with too-rapid growth during the past
decade are discussed in Andrew Kirby & A. Karen Lynch, A Ghost in the Growth
Machine: The Aftermath of Rapid Population Growth in Houston, 24 URB. STUD. 587
(1987).
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adjustments, and judicious human and physical capital invest-
ment policies that underwrite, rather than undermine, family
and community responses.
VII. REDIRECTING LEGAL REFORM
In the search for a new focus for legal reform, we should take
our cues from the recent past. More than three decades ago,
deepening discontent with societal arrangements and outcomes
launched two broad reform strategies. One strategy has served
us well; the other largely has failed us. The different outcomes
can be attributed to the very different conceptions of (1) what
the fundamental problem is and (2) what an appropriate
reform response to that problem should be.
The first strategy focused on a changing society and the
barriers facing many Americans in gaining access to it. The
response was a legal reform movement expressed as a civil
rights policy. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,165 the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,' 66 and the Fair Housing Act of
1968,167 laid the legal foundation for opposing discrimination
in employment, electoral access and participation, and housing.
By delineating the rights of individuals and the responsibilities
of institutions, these reforms largely eradicated the legal
barriers to equal access. Other more subtle barriers still
remain, but, while continuing debate largely, has revolved
around definitions of inclusiveness and coverage, the larger
effort can be regarded as a success.
The second broad strategy that took root in the early 1960s
involved successive attempts to tackle "urban" problems. By
the early 1970s this effort had led to a series of attempts to
articulate a national urban policy.168 This strategy has gener-
ally failed, largely due to the unavoidable temptation to steer
urban economic development patterns rather than to develop
strategies to expand Americans' access to them wherever these
165. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000a-2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
166. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973ff-6 (1988)).
167. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
168. See Stegman, supra note 13, at 1751-62.
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patterns might lead. In that sense, urban policy goals often
have run directly counter to broad social welfare and related
poverty policy goals. This national policy has specified prefer-
ences for particular social and economic organizations into
which-and then out of which-the nation has been in transit
across the past two centuries.
As a result, a national urban policy has been a catch-all for
nearly every cultural grievance associated with an evolving
urban economy. Included in the list of so-called solutions have
been ill-conceived visions of preserving broad-based central-city
dominance of urban areas, restoring historical downtown
functions, blunting the effects of adopted transportation and
communication technologies, confusing uneven development
rates across political jurisdictions with more pernicious and
willful forms of inequality and injustice, applying one-size-fits-
all policy responses to the idiosyncrasies of local development
dynamics, and depicting the transformation of a manufacturing
economy into a services-dominated economy as somehow
regrettable.169 More fundamentally, however, a national urban
policy is based on the presumption that the federal govern-
ment, in partnership with state and local governments, is
capable of channeling the evolution of national settlement
patterns. A national urban policy also presumes that it can
steer a course leading to rising levels of national wealth,
health, and welfare which is unattainable by more spontaneous
adjustments. Yet, there is precious little evidence in support
of these presumptions.
If the poverty and attendant social ills found today in our
inner cities, and increasingly in our suburbs, are to be ad-
dressed, we should not begin by fanning the embers of a past
national urban policy debate. The problems in our cities should
not be assumed to be the problems of our cities. Rather, they
are primarily the problems faced by individuals and households
in the process of gaining access to the urban economy trans-
forming around them. There is a demonstrable need for policy
planning guided by a deeper understanding of the developmen-
tal forces shaping urban social and economic outcomes, and a
new era of legal reform will require this kind of guidance.
169. All these criticisms are leveled at the national urban policy genre in general.
See Drier, supra note 58 (addressing America's neglect of the urban crisis and
proposing policy solutions aimed at revitalizing America's cities). See generally HUD
REPORT 1980, supra note 59, at 3-16 to 3-17 (encouraging a national role in efforts by
localities to retain manufacturing industries).
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"Cities, like the people who live in them, have a natural
cycle. Yet the decline of America's inner cities is far from
irreversible. Much of what is wrong with these places can be
traced to plain bad government. That can be changed."170 The
guiding premise of a new era of legal reform should not be
driven by assumptions that our cities no longer work and must
therefore be rejuvenated. Rather, it should be to find ways to
let our cities work and to broaden the access of distressed
communities and households to the outcomes they provide.
Reformers should be open to the possibility that much of what
we associate with the decline of our inner cities largely may be
traced to burdens placed on the inner cities as a consequence
of past and continuing efforts to intervene in development
processes which are not well understood. The following sections
consider a partial list of urban ills widely attributed to the
failure of our cities and briefly indicate how they might be
reinterpreted in light of this proposed new framework of legal
reform.
A. Employment and Enterprise Opportunity
The image of an urban economy perniciously redistributing
employment opportunities to suburban areas beyond the reach
of the inner-city poor is being overtaken rapidly by a new
reality. Increasingly, the consequential gaps separating people
from employment opportunities are less related to the problems
of overcoming physical space and more related to a lack of
marketable skills and other barriers.' 7 ' During the past decade,
as the number of jobs per central city resident has risen,'72
skill mismatches have come to present at least as much of a
problem for our urban poor as the spatial mismatches empha-
sized three decades ago.'73 The slow transformation of subur-
ban labor markets and the dispersion of poverty into the
suburbs during the 1980s suggests that suburbs are by no
means exempt from the dynamics increasingly linking unem-
ployment to unemployability.
170. Hell Is a Dying City, supra note 68, at 13.
171. See Kasarda, supra note 20, at 33-67; Kasarda, supra note 98, at 4-1 to 4-60.
172. See James, supra note 91, at 8.
173. See Kain, supra note 26, at 183-84.
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Employment options are related to enterprise opportunities.
Among the reasons many of our inner-city residents have
grown prosperity-proof is that the business climates serving
them have been rendered investment-adverse. 7 4 High rates of
municipal taxation and spending, inefficient urban service
delivery systems, burdensome regulations and restrictions, and
bloated public bureaucracies place an enormous burden on the
capacities of our central cities to incubate new enterprise. 175
In the pursuit of other worthwhile goals, we often have
raised the business costs of existing enterprises in ways that
are likely to diminish employment opportunities generally. The
regulation impulse often imposes costs so onerous as to stifle
economic growth and enterprise development and thereby
burden the entire economy. 176 Recent estimates, for example,
suggest that the aggregate cost of federal regulation ranges
between $881 billion and $1.66 trillion annually.177 The issue
is not simply whether or not funds expended on regulation help
our society realize gains in health, wealth, and overall welfare;
rather, it is whether or not the gains necessarily outweigh
what would be attainable in the absence of such expenditures.
Increasingly, the assumption that such gains do outweigh the
costs merits skepticism.
The affirmative action extension of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 also illustrates the issue. 178 The purpose of requiring
174. See Have Capital, Will Flourish, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 33, 33-34.
175. See, e.g., Moore & Stansel, supra note 62, at 2-4. The counterproductive
impact of rising local taxes is clearly illustrated in Robert P. Inman, Can Philadelphia
Escape Its Fiscal Crisis with Another Tax Increase?, Bus. REV. (Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia), Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 5. A 20% increase in the city's effective property
tax rate can be expected to reduce city property values by 12%; a similar increase in
business taxes will reduce the business tax base by 8.2%; and a similar increase in
the average wage tax rate can be expected to lead to a 12.7% decline in the tax base
per resident. Id. at 5 app. Finally, the National League of Cities reported that 72%
of its members either raised taxes or fees, or imposed new ones. Henry Tatum, A
Crisis for America's Cities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 1992, at 25A.
176. For example, in the case of the future development of the much-heralded
"information superhighway", concern is building that federal regulation is likely to
stifle, or at least substantially delay, the organizational changes and capital flows
required to accomplish the development of this critical infrastructure. In the wake
of recent back-to-back FCC regulations trimming rates 10% and 7%, respectively, on
cable television services, multibillion dollar mergers involving Bell Atlantic-Tele-
Communications Inc. (TCI) and Cox-Southwestern Bell have been called off.
177. William G. Laffer III & Nancy A. Bord, George Bush's Hidden Tax: The
Explosion in Regulation, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), July 10,
1992.
178. Affirmative action, which was instituted in 1965 by means of Exec. Order
11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), extends the protection against employment
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federal contractors to take "affirmative action" was to ensure
that their workforces look like local labor forces. While the goal
may be worthwhile, and evidence of some benefits is avail-
able, 179 these benefits must be judged against the costs of
compliance. To date, relatively little empirical evidence exists
on this latter question. Nonetheless, what evidence there is
suggests that for firms subject to affirmative action regula-
tions, the cost of hiring workers is at a minimum six percent
greater than where such regulations do not apply. 8 ° Businesses
in demographically less diverse regions and in service in-
dustries, where labor costs tend to drive business costs, are at
a particular disadvantage. Moreover, for some time, evidence
has indicated that self-employment via entrepreneurship has
become a less viable option for black men and women.' 8 ' Lower
rates of self-employment effectively reduce the options of
discrimination offered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). It requires that all private sector federal
contractors covered by Title VII take "affirmative action" to ensure employment
equality. Affirmative action, despite its salutary intentions, functions as a labor
market regulation. While some regulations are both desirable and effective, empirical
evidence suggests that the costs imposed on employers may be so great that the net
effect is to dampen employment creation and growth. See notes 175-77 and accompa-
nying text.
179. Evidence of the expansion of employment opportunities for racial minorities
and women has been demonstrated in part by Orley Ashenfelter & James Heckman,
Measuring the Effect of an Anti-Discrimination Program, in EVALUATING THE LABOR
MARKET EFFCTS OF SOCIAL PROGRAMs 46, 76-77 (Orley Ashenfelter & James Blum eds.,
1976); Jonathan S. Leonard, Employment and Occupational Advance under Affirmative
Action, 66 REV. ECON. & STAT. 377, 381-84 (1984); Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact
of Affirmative Action on Employment, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 439,459 (1984); James P. Smith
& Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Labor Markets, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 269, 280-83
(1984).
180. Peter Griffin estimates that these costs range between six and seven percent
of total production. Peter Griffin, The Impact ofAffirmative Action on Labor Demand:
A Test of Some Implications of the Le Chatelier Principle, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 251
(1992). More recently, estimates as high as 22% have been reported. Peter Griffin et
al., Occupational, Demographic, and Regional Patterns ofAffirmative Action Compli-
ance Costs 13 (Feb. 24, 1994) (paper presented at the Western Regional Science
Association meetings in Tucson, Ariz.) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
181. By 1980, black men could expect 34.3% lower annual earnings and black
women, 45.0% lower annual earnings from self-employment than from payrolls.
Franklin J. James & Thomas A. Clark, Minority Business in Urban Economies, 24
URB. STUD. 489, 494-95 (1987). Of course, the discrepancy may reflect in part
increasing employment alternatives for minorities during this period. Indeed, the
earnings differential of black men relative to white men narrowed substantially
throughout the 1970s. Id. at 495.
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minority poor seeking to follow a well-worn path out of per-
sonal or neighborhood poverty.
B. Educational Opportunity
One key to success in restructuring urban labor markets is
education. Technological changes restructuring the demand for
labor led to above-average wage increases for more educated
workers during the 1980s.182 Indeed, the returns of education,
especially a college degree, have never been greater. Evidence
suggests that education may-be a more powerful explanatory
variable than race in accessing this new economy. 183 June
O'Neill has reported that after controlling for educational
attainment, math and language skills, and years of work
experience, the gap in earnings between black men and white
men is virtually eliminated.'84
Despite the rising importance of marketable skills and
worker competencies in transforming urban labor markets,
education reforms such as vouchers and related ways of ex-
panding school choice for parents and entire communities still
are viewed as threats by school bureaucracies. Yet, there needs
to be new delivery systems devised by which to provide educa-
tion and training. It is far from clear that the uncertain
outcomes of a wholesale reformation of selected public school
182. See John Bound & George Johnson, Changes in the Structure of Wages in the
1980's:An Evaluation ofAlternative Explanations, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 371,389 (1992).
According to Bound and Johnson, during 1979-1988 the wage gap between high school
and college graduates widened for both men and women at all levels of work
experience, but especially for young men with less than 10 years of work experience.
Id. at 373; see also Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Industrial Change and the Rising
Importance of Skill, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 101, 129 (Sheldon
Danzinger & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993) (finding that "demand for college-trained
employees has increased"); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, The Structure of Wages,
107 Q.J. ECON. 285, 287 (1992) ("By the late 1980s school-related wage differences are
larger than in any of the earlier years."). For an analysis of the increasing returns
to education as a phenomenon across advanced industrial nations, see Earnings In-
equality: Changes in the 1980s, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, France), July 1993, at 157, 170-73.
183. June O'Neill, The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences Between
Black and White Men, J. ECON. PERsP., Fall 1990, at 25, 25-45.
184. See id. at 42.
Revitalizing Our Cities
866 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 27:3&4
bureaucracies are really that much more of a gamble than the
known outcomes of the current system.
C. Housing Quality, Affordability, and Homelessness
As is the case with urban poverty, discussions of housing
frequently overlook the gains made concurrently with the
urban development trends of the past half-century. During the
1980s, the physical quality of the nation's housing stock
continued a pattern of long-term improvements, while over-
crowding was reduced." 5 As local housing policy strategies and
markets have eliminated much substandard housing,'86 and
most Americans have improved their housing situation;
homelessness may represent, at least in part, an unintended
consequence of these efforts. Homelessness represents a
condition maintained primarily by both rising affordability
problems among the poor and widespread personal problems
in the form of mental illness and substance abuse. The
affordability issue stems more from low income (demand) than
from federal housing programs (supply) that are widely be-
lieved to have been cut massively during the 1980s.1
8 7
However, a broad variety of regulations including restrictions
on location of low-cost housing, building restrictions, rent
control, and even environmental regulations such as the
Endangered Species Act 188 operate to drive up housing costs in
urban areas. Similarly, exclusionary zoning, growth controls,
excessive development fees, and restrictive subdivision controls
represent special threats to affordable housing in suburbs and
other affluent areas.'89 At a time when homelessness and
related housing problems increasingly reflect demand-side
concerns related to low incomes rather than supply problems,
bureaucracy and red tape can add tens of thousands of dollars
to the cost of building a home. For example, in 1989, the cost
185. See Richard Peiser et al., Housing Markets and Patterns, in REDISCOVERING
URBAN AMERICA, supra note 15, at 5-1, 5-2 to 5-4.
186. "Physical quality has improved so much that the traditional measures of
inadequate housing-such as units lacking complete plumbing or overcrowding-are
increasingly irrelevant." Id. at 5-2.
187. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS 81-93 (1994).
188. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, U.S.
DEPIT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, "NOT IN MY BACK YARD": REMOVING BARRIERS
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 3-5 to 3-9, 4-7 to 4-11 (1991).
189. Id. at 2-1 to 2-12.
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of permits and approvals for a single family home in Orange
County, California was estimated to be $20,000.190
D. Dual Illegitimacies: Welfare
and Immigration Policies
Ultimately, the redistribution of population to suburbs and
beyond may not be as consequential for distressed urban
communities as shifts in the influx of people into the commu-
nities in the first place. There are two distinct domains where
the net effect of current policies actually may work to aggra-
vate poverty and distress in our urban areas and overburden
the abilities of these areas to deal with their problems: (1)
illegitimacy through birth and (2) illegitimacy through immi-
gration. The resulting burden of these dual illegitimacies may
well disrupt the adaptive capacities of entire communities.
These two sources pose special problems, and both involve the
stigma of illegitimacy.
The first kind of illegitimacy involves people who are brought
into the population by unwed parents. Although many nontra-
ditional family forms can and do demonstrate the remarkable
flexibility of the very notion of family, this sociological diversity
often camouflages economic marginality. This is nowhere truer
than when households are composed of young, generally poor,
uneducated, unwed women with children. While widely regard-
ed as a minority issue, in fact, this issue is of growing concern
across all demographic groups in the nation today.'9 ' An
estimated 30% of all children born in the United States are
born to single women, up from only 5.3% in 1960. Meanwhile,
one child in seven (12.9% in 1991) is supported by Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), up from only 3.5%
190. Id. at 2-12.
191. The preoccupation with the ominous increase in minority children being born
out of wedlock has virtually obscured the features of the rest of the black community.
"Middle-class blacks have stable husband-wife unions, very low fertility, and probably
the lowest rate of illegitimacy of any major group in America." William Alonso, The
Connectedness and the Limits of Demography, BUS. CONTEMP. WORLD, Winter 1991, at
29, 32. Beneath the surface of rising numbers of black children being born out of
wedlock are actual declines in black fertility rates generally. "The birth rates of
unmarried black women have actually declined by 13% since 1970, but because
married black women's childbearing rates have dropped much more sharply, by 38%,
statistics show an increase in the proportion of total births out of wedlock." Stephanie
T. Coontz, Pro-Family but Divorced from the Facts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1989, at A10.
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in 1960.192 Hill and O'Neill have reported a strong positive
effect of increases in the value of AFDC and Food Stamp
benefits on the number of illegitimate births while controlling
for a variety of personal, income and education, and contextual,
urban and neighborhood, circumstances. 193 Yet, even leaving
the issue of illegitimacy aside for the moment, the child poverty
rate has risen sharply during the past quarter century among
all family types. Indeed, the larger the number of children in
a family, the higher the child poverty rate, controlling for race
and family structure. 94
There has been much moral speculation that children being
born out of wedlock represents a fraying of the cultural forces
critical to social and economic order. While there may be some
truth to that position, it need not be the motivating factor here.
Legitimacy is nothing more nor less than the- orderly
transfer of social meaning across the generations....
[C]hildren are the ultimate illegal aliens. They are undoc-
umented immigrants to our world, who must be socialized
and invested with identity, a culture and an estate. By
conferring legitimacy marriage keeps this process from
becoming chaos."'
More practically, while the major source of poverty is low
wages, a major reason why poverty for some is permanent and
even intergenerational relates to the fact that many families
are formed in ways that render them irrelevant to the economy
around them. The circularity of this process is evident in
studies that report that the longer a black man resides in a
poor neighborhood, the lower his chances of finding a job, and
the higher the likelihood that a black woman will bear children
out of wedlock. 196 Yet, the surge of unwed pregnancy among
those least able to rebound from its consequences poses a major
192. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS 6 (Heritage
Found. & Empower America eds., 1993).
193. See M. ANNE HILL & JUNE O'NEILL, UNDERCLASS BEHAVIORS IN THE UNITED
STATES: MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS (1993).
194. Peter Gottschalk & Sheldon Danziger, Family Structure, Family Size, and
Family Income: Accounting for Changes in the Economic Well-Being of Children,
1968-1986, in UNEVEN TIDES: RISING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA, supra note 182, at 167,
176.
195. David W. Murray, Poor Suffering Bastards: An Anthropologist Looks at
Illegitimacy, POLY REV., Spring 1994, at 9, 10.
196. Massey et al., supra note 31, at 416-17.
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threat to the larger capacity of urban neighborhoods to serve
as staging areas for families to rise out of poverty.
Of course, while many households are weakened economically
by the misfortunes of divorce or death, many others are the
byproduct of a welfare dependency that has been eroding the
adaptive capacity of both the nuclear and extended family as
well as the larger community.' s Unwittingly, we have created
a welfare system that produces problem families faster than
poor neighborhoods can absorb them and in forms that mightily
constrain their options for rising out of poverty. By artificially
decreasing the social price of illegitimacy, we have purchased
more of it. And in the process, we have reduced the attractive-
ness or accessibility of stable marriages and steady employ-
ment as routes out of poverty.19 While the causal sequences
among these factors are doubtless complex, available evidence
suggests that the welfare dependency so highly associated with
illegitimate births among unwed young women reduces the
attractiveness of both marriage and employment. Hill and
O'Neill report that increases in the value of welfare benefits
reduce the labor force participation of young males in a com-
munity, thereby making them less attractive potential mar-
riage partners. This finding appears consistent with those
indicating a strong anti-work effect across comparison groups
in the Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiments
(SIME/DIME) conducted by the Office of Economic Opportunity
during the 1971-1978 period.199
A second kind of illegitimacy placing a heavy burden on
many of our largest urban areas is related to the influx of
immigrants. During the 1980s alone, an estimated 9.9 million
legal immigrants settled in the United States along with two
million undocumented ones, bringing the foreign-born popula-
tion residing in the United States to a level one-third (thirty-
197. For a well-documented summary of the impacts of illegitimacy on health,
physical well-being, emotional development, education, behavior of illegitimate
children, as well as community related impacts, including crime and welfare, see
Patrick F. Fagan, Rising Illegitimacy: America's Social Catastrophe, F.Y.I. (Heritage
Found., Washington, D.C.), June 29, 1994, at 1, 1-10.
198. "[Ploor people are to a large degree created by low wages. ... [However,]
welfare does appear to discourage employment to a limited extent, and acts especially
to encourage the formation of female-headed families." Eggers & Massey, Structural
Determinants, supra note 38, at 250-51.
199. Results reported in Gregory B. Christiansen & Walter E. Williams, Welfare,
Family Cohesiveness, and Out-of-Wedlock Births, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE
STATE 381, 398 (Joseph R. Peden & Fred R. Glahe eds., 1986).
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four percent) higher than 1980.200 Moreover, foreign immigra-
tion accounted for nearly forty percent of the growth in the
nation's total population in the 1980s while accounting for only
twenty-five percent in the growth of the labor market.20' The
composition of recent immigrant waves has been changing as
well.20 2 While the share of foreign immigrants possessing
advanced educational credentials rose during the 1980s, an
estimated one-quarter of workers in the United States with
less than a high school education are foreign immigrants. As
a result, rising shares of foreign immigrants have become
mired in urban poverty.
Despite cogent arguments to the contrary,20 3 rising levels of
foreign immigration during the decade have come to be
associated with rising fiscal and social burdens on the economy
at-large.20 4 Efforts to assimilate the influx of foreign-born immi-
grants during the 1980s were accompanied by diverse patterns
of impacts. In those metropolitan areas in which post-1980
foreign-born arrivals comprised a relatively large portion of
total population growth-akin to a heavy "dose" of foreign
immigration--economic growth was relatively rapid. The
proper causal relationship is not certain here, however, because'
new immigrants could well have been drawn selectively to a
few of the nation's fastest-growing metropolitan areas during
the decade. At the same time, however, these heavy "doses" of
foreign immigration across metropolitan areas were associated
with dampened real income and wage growth as well as
relatively slow shifts to higher-productivity industrial mixes.
These patterns lend credence to the view that major urban
centers may well be paying a steep price for having to assimi-
200. A Sourcebook for the Immigration Debate, URB. INST. POLY & RES. REP.,
Summer 1994, at 20, 20 (discussing a report by Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel).
201. See George J. Boijas, Immigration, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
484, 484 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993).
202. For a discussion of the overall deterioration in the skill level of immigrants,
see GEORGE J. BoRiAs, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY 142-49, 218-28 (1990).
203. A Sourcebook for the Immigration Debate, supra note 200, at 21; JULIAN L.
SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (1989).
204. See Immigrants and Welfare, URB. INST. POLY & RES. REP., Fall 1993, at 7,7-8
(summarizing research by Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel concluding that the
economic and social welfare costs associated with immigration are overstated); George
J. Borjas & Marta Tienda, The Economic Consequences of Immigration 21 (July 1986)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the Institute on Research on Poverty, Discus-
sion Paper No. 816-86, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(concluding that although immigration has increased, "there is no basis for concluding
that it has exceeded the growth rate or absorptive capacity of the U.S. labor force").
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late relatively large numbers of recent arrivals even during a
period of relatively rapid national economic expansion.0 5
While the sheer volume and changing composition of recent
immigration flows may impede their eventual integration into
rapidly-transforming urban economies, part of the special
burden of illegal immigration is that rising shares of foreign
immigrants have become mired in poverty.0 6 According to
United States Census data, the 1990 poverty rate of post-1980
arrivals was twenty-three percent, up from only eleven percent
in 1980.207 For the most part, only a relatively few urban areas
across the nation have had to accommodate the bulk of these
new arrivals. Six states were the destinations for over fifty
percent of the immigrants during the 1980s, and California
alone was the destination of fully one-third of them.20 8 The
local impacts have been especially significant. For example,
while more than one-third of the 1980 population of the Miami-
Fort Lauderdale region were immigrants from abroad, during
the 1980s new arrivals from foreign countries accounted for an
increment equal to fully 17.5% of the size of the region's 1980
population base.20 9 Questions can be raised concerning the
capacities of these receiving areas to assimilate growing
cultural diversity, to educate school-age children who share
little cultural or linguistic common ground, and to offer em-
ployment opportunities to new arrivals.210
CONCLUSION
There is a pervasive sentiment that our cities are beset by
such interdependent crises that saving them will require a
renewed commitment to a national urban policy. Central to
205. Donald A. Hicks & Steven R. Nivin, Technology-Related Capital Investment
and Regional Economic Performance 30-31 (Dec. 30, 1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
206. Michael J. Mandel, America's Newest Immigrants are Poorer-But Smarter,
Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1993, at 26.
207. Id.
208. See A Sourcebook for the Immigration Debate, supra note 200, at 21. While
this represents the highest immigration level for any decade since the 1901-1910
period, the immigration experienced in this century's first decade constituted a far
larger relative addition to the nation's population. See Borjas, supra note 201, at 485.
209. See Hicks & Nivin, supra note 205, at 42.
210. Id. at 30-31.
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this vision is that our cities, especially our central cities, are
failing not only because of what, and who, have been leaving
them but also because of what, and who, have been left behind.
This Article has sought to redirect this sentiment. A rein-
vigorated national urban policy effort that attempts to fix our
cities so they work like they have previously misses the
point. Picking up where we left off in the late 1970s would be
counterproductive at best. The implementation of develop-
ment-oriented national urban policies is neither wise nor
even possible.: Implementing policies aimed at expanding
opportunity and achieving the broadest possible wealth,
health, and welfare gains by attempting to ensure that any
gains be delivered through the geoindustrial and settlement
arrangements of a bygone era is ill-advised.
The economy of this nation and its ties to each of us have
been transformed dramatically in recent decades. Not sur-
prisingly, many of the accompaniments of these changes have
unorganized political or cultural constituencies and therefore
continue to invite considerable skepticism, if not undiluted
hostility. It would be unwise to assume that this latest chap-
ter in a centuries-long, industrial-era story has somehow
caused us to overshoot a golden age of urban America that
we are now leaving behind at our peril.
Because urban areas concentrate people and their activities,
those circumstances which trouble us most-poverty, illiteracy,
unemployment, crime, and intergroup tensions--command a
heightened visibility. As a result, observers often equate cities
with these problems in a causal sense. This is especially ironic
since urban areas around the world have been precisely the
instruments by which health, wealth, and welfare levels are
improved over time.
Today, as we first measure the performance of the nation's
economy and the broad social gains we have come to expect, we
encounter thousands of urban areas organized into, or neigh-
boring, hundreds of metropolitan areas. Only later in our
analyses do we begin to see the outlines of a larger coherent
urban system. The emergence of this sprawling urban economy,
and its ascendance as the core of our contribution to a global-
scale economy, represents a series of ceaseless structural ad-
justments.
There is abundant evidence that local economies, like people,
can and do face adversity and rebound from it. This capacity
should be strengthened and reinforced. Our nation's densest
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settlements will remain the sites of difficult adjustments to be
sure. This is true, however, in large part because the opportu-
nities offered by transforming new industrial cities are often
irrelevant and inaccessible to legions of inner-city poor. The
more troublesome gulfs defining the nation's new economic
geography are defined less by urban-rural, city-suburb, North-
South distinctions, and more by the barriers that divide those
who do and those who do not have access to these new emerg-
ing economic arrangements.
It also is increasingly apparent that many of these problems
are clustered around individual and institutional deficits, such
as economically fragile and vulnerable single-parent house-
holds; insufficient educational or occupational skills to negoti-
ate rapidly changing labor markets; and often inappropriate
behaviors and values of the kind that relate to the absence of
solid community role models, the relative attractiveness of
illegal activities, and little experience with the world of work.
These make it difficult for cities and neighborhoods to function.
That is, characteristics ofpeople diminish the capacity ofplaces
to perform the economic upgrading function they have in the
past. In order for cities to work for people in the face of these
multiple afflictions, we must devise policies that begin to
eliminate these afflictions. A national urban policy which
focuses on how cities perform cannot do the work of policies
focusing on reintegrating people into the world of work and
raising the costs of discrimination, illegitimacy and welfare
dependency so that ultimately, we may reduce them. Most of
these circumstances lie well beyond the direct reach of any con-
ceivable national urban policy in which the guiding vision is
the need somehow to "fix" our cities.
There is enough evidence to suggest that people can and
routinely do escape poverty-stricken neighborhoods to encour-
age us to look beyond the simple mechanism of geographic
concentration alone when trying to explain persistent ghetto
poverty. What we invariably see is that the handholds avail-
able for use in their rise out of poverty include interlocking
networks of local institutions radiating outward from the
nuclear family. Regrettably, however, a phalanx of poverty
policies and cultural worldviews unleashed in the 1960s has
had the tragic and unintended effect of systematically debili-
tating many of those institutional resources that have served
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poor people in the past.21' Not the least of these effects has
been the diminishment of the moral authority of these insti-
tutions in the face of material obstacles.
And so while the economic structures of our urban economies
have been transformed substantially during the past four
decades, the structures of families and households, schools, and
neighborhood communities have been altered even faster. Even
though the poverty-pooling function is a time honored role of
cities, in recent decades we have witnessed-and even encour-
aged through public subsidy-the creation and expansion of
populations on whom poverty's grip is far more than material.
In effect, many of the problems pooled in inner-city areas-and
increasingly beyond-today are those of our own making. We
have pursued a variety of social policy, legislative, and cultural
recipes that have often inadvertently victimized those we have
sought to help. This has left us with a calcified underclass,
much of which is inassimilable. And so, much of the urban
poverty that today would energize a return to some form of a
national urban policy reflects far more a form of economic and
social "indigestion" than the deterioration of cities per se.
Nearly all of the best features of our nation's urban system
today are the consequence of a free and open economy with
appropriate legal and regulatory safeguards enforced by
government. The federal policy stance offering the greatest
possible prospects for distressed communities is one which
places the greatest emphasis on sound fiscal and monetary
policies, effective enforcement of civil rights legislation, in-
creased educational expectations and performance, the
expansion of mobility options, and a general cessation of subsi-
dizing behaviors among the most vulnerable that hinder their
reattachment to the larger society and economy.
A new era of legal reform must acknowledge the nation's
larger urban system as more than a collection of discrete
places. It must recognize that policy responses to changing
internal and external circumstances cannot be viewed in
isolation from one another, and it must free itself from the
impulse to define problems in cities as problems of cities. This
broader view requires conveying a sense of appreciation of the
prospects for continuous adjustment and spontaneous order.
The role of legal reforms can be promising to the extent that
211. For a recent expression of this perspective, see MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM
AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIXTIES' LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
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they work to reduce the barriers to full social and economic
participation facing many people in our society. In order to
reduce these barriers, we need to recognize the diversity
present across inner cities as well as within the ranks of the
urban poor. Some can be-and routinely are-rescued from
episodic poverty through an expanding economy as well as
through their own educational and entrepreneurial efforts to
escape their circumstances. For them, rigorous enforcement of
civil rights legislation, functioning criminal justice and educa-
tional systems, and a thinning out of the regulatory under-
brush that clogs urban economies outweigh more city-oriented
initiatives.
For those others for whom poverty is more endemic and even
intergenerational, other kinds of policy responses are likely to
be more productive. They include fundamental welfare reform
which reinforces the links between work and rewards and
ceases subsidizing child and partner abandonment among
young males and childbearing among young females. Such
reforms should be guided by compassion born of an honest
reassessment of the welfare statecraft practiced during the last
three decades rather than a niggardliness born of frustration.
This means that those programs that promote reentry into the
labor force, family stability, and experimentation with educa-
tional and health care delivery systems should have benefits
increased, while those that promote childbearing among unwed
teens, school dropouts, and inactivity rather than work should
have benefits reduced or eliminated. Ultimately, it means that
leaving ghettos-physically, psychically, or both-be accorded
equal value. After all, we should have learned by now that the
"urban" dimension of the world in which we live is ever in flux,
and settlement form and function are ever in transit. Legisla-
tion is best-new or reformed-which reduces obstacles for
those who might otherwise have difficulty making the transit
along with others. Once these things are recognized, one-size-
fits-all urban policy responses orchestrated by the federal
government begin to appear less intellectually or morally
compelling.
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